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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores the systemic behavior of illegal mass migration in the Central 
Mediterranean region and proposes strategic approaches to address the problem. We 
hypothesize that the illegal migration is a complex systemic problem, where parts of the 
system are interdependent and behavioral change of any element affects the behavior of 
the whole. 
 This research applies a series of quantitative and qualitative analyses where each 
reveals different aspects and properties of the migration system as a whole. The systemic 
analysis highlights the interconnectedness of different parts and their impact of the 
system’s output. Also, it reveals the cognitive background as a unique aspect of this 
region: namely, the decision to migrate is based on biased perception and bounded 
rationality rather than rational choice. 
 In conclusion, we claim that the system’s output (i.e., level of illegal migration) is 
characterized by the interrelated behavior of parts of the migration system; therefore, 
strategic planning requires the notion of the dominant feedback loops, self-organization, 
time delays, limitations, and non-linear relations. Also, we conclude that a skewed 
perception based on social influence and cognitive biases influences a large number of 
people in that region to migrate. 
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Since 2015, illegal mass migration—and its interrelated challenges like human 
trafficking, terrorism, weapon smuggling, and drug gangs—is the pre-eminent threat that 
has emerged on the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the European Union (EU).1 On January 1, 2019, 4.9% of the total population of the EU 
27—21.8 million people—was composed of non-EU citizens.2 According to the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), 2.3 million illegal border-crossings (IBCs) 
were detected in 2015 and 2016.3 Although this number decreased to 150,144 in 2018 due 
to countermeasures like the enhanced border protection of most EU countries, the EU-
Turkey migration pact, and the EU-Libya relations, member countries on the southern flank 
still perceive significant illegal migration pressure in the Mediterranean and Balkans 
regions.4 At the end of March 2020, 940,960 asylum applications were pending.5 
Consequently, millions of illegal migrants entered EU/NATO countries without any legal 
control or security check upon their border crossing.  
Considering the security aspect of the illegal migration, transnational terrorism and 
humanitarian crisis are imminent threats, while the expansion of diaspora/parallel societies 
and decreasing resilience among target and transit countries are potential consequences in 
the long run. As the European Union’s Law Enforcement Agency (EUROPOL) annual 
Terrorism Situation and Trend Report indicates, there is a strong correlation between the 
number of terrorist attacks and the number of illegal migrants (see Appendix A for 
 
1 Alessandro Marrone, “What’s New on NATO’s Southern Flank: Security Threats and the Alliance’s 
Role after the Warsaw Summitˮ (working paper, Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2016), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22159. 
2 “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics,ˮ Eurostat, accessed 1 March 2021, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. 
3  “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics,ˮ Frontex, accessed 4 September 2020, 
https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/. 
4 Eurostat, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.ˮ  
5 European Asylum Support Office, “Latest Asylum Trends,ˮ accessed 18 July 2020, 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends; and European Parliament, ‘Asylum and Migration in the 




details).6 Moreover, with cases such as the illegal detention centers in Libya, arson in the 
Moria Camp in Greece, or continuing loss of life in the journey across the Mediterranean 
Sea, one can argue that the humanitarian crisis escalated along main migratory routes.7 As 
a long-term challenge, we might be concerned with emerging parallel societies and 
consequently the decreased resilience level of EU/NATO countries.8  
Both NATO and the EU realize the urgency of addressing the complex and diverse 
threats emanating from the south, but the two organizations recently applied different 
approaches to address the threat. While NATO concluded that the illegal mass migration 
is a severe security threat to the Alliance and dedicated the NATO Strategic Direction 
South Hub to address it, the reactions of EU countries have been less unified due to their 
varying political perspectives.9 To summarize, illegal mass migration has created a severe 
humanitarian crisis along the main migration routes, while it has also provided channels to 
violent extremist organizations to infiltrate and operate within the territory of the North 
Atlantic Alliance and created inherent vulnerability points within EU and NATO countries. 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the illegal 
migration and propose strategic approaches that aim to increase the stability and security 
of NATO/EU member countries and decrease the suffering and exploitation of migrant 
 
6 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat) 2018 (European Union, 2018), 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-
trend-report-2018-tesat-2018. 
7 Gábor Pap, “Milíciák Líbiában: Hatásuk Az Ország Biztonsági Helyzetére, Bel- És Külpolitikájára 
[Militias in Libya: Their Impact on the Security Situation, Interior and Foreign Policy of the Country]ˮ 
(master’s thesis, University of Public Service, 2019); and “Moria Migrants: Fire Destroys Greek Camp 
Leaving 13,000 without Shelter,ˮ BBC News, 9 September 2020, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-54082201; and Simona Varrella, “Deaths of Migrants in the Mediterranean Sea 2014–2020,ˮ 
Statista, accessed 26 January 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1082077/deaths-of-migrants-in-the-
mediterranean-sea/. 
8 Dénes Albert, “Berlin’s Migrant Clans Are Major Factor behind High Crime Rate, Chief Prosecutor 
Says,ˮ Remix, 1 October 2020, https://rmx.news/article/article/berlin-s-migrant-clans-are-major-factor-
behind-high-crime-rate-chief-prosecutor-says. 
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Brussels Summit Key Decisions 11–12 July 2018ˮ (North 




populations. This thesis argues that a multi-disciplinary systemic analysis is a necessary 
approach to understand and mitigate illegal mass migration in the Central Mediterranean. 
Illegal migration is a complex systemic problem where parts of the system are 
interdependent and the “behavior of each element has an effect on the behavior of the 
whole.”10 Consequently, analyzing any of the subsystem without the notion of the system 
as a whole would lose sight of some fundamental properties of the system. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW: MIGRATION THEORIES 
E. G. Ravenstein in 1885 laid down the fundamentals of the modern migration 
theories in his work titled The Laws of Migration.11 This study identified certain factors 
like infrastructure, distance, call for labor market, and commerce that drove migration 
throughout the United Kingdom. Based on Ravenstein’s widely admired findings, a set of 
scholars developed theoretical background to migration based on economic and 
demographic functions.12  
Everett S. Lee’s migration model in 1966 served as a basis for the widely applied 
push-pull model that explains the reasons to emigrate as a net effect of those factors and 
the obstacles between the origin and the destination country.13 However, this model only 
took into account the aggregate effects of the push and pull factors and failed to explain 
empirical observations, as it excluded environmental (exogenous) factors.14 
 
10 Russell Lincoln Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future: Plan or Be Planned For (New York: 
Wiley, 1981), 15. 
11 E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,ˮ Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48, no. 2 
(1885): 167–235, https://doi.org/10.2307/2979181. 
12 John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-
Sector Analysis,ˮ The American Economic Review 60, no. 1 (1970): 126–42; and Harry Jerome, Migration 
and Business Cycles (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926), 
https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/migration-and-business-cycles; and Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of 
Migration,ˮ Demography 3, no. 1 (1966): 47–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/2060063. 
13 Lee, “A Theory of Migration.ˮ  
14 Silvia Migali et al., International Migration Drivers, JRC112622 (Luxembourg: Publications Office 




To overcome these shortcomings, neo-classical economic theories explored the 
dynamics of migrant flow based on economic drivers. These theories were built on two 
basic assumptions: (1) Individuals are rational actors who tend to maximize their well-
being based on economic differences between origin and destination countries, and (2) the 
interplay between these actors tends to reach an equilibrium in the marketplace.15 These 
findings highlighted the interactions between the agents but did not explicitly address 
feedback mechanisms and systemic behavior. Also, the model was not able to explain 
empirically observed patterns.16 
Based on the fundamental notion of Ravenstein’s “Laws,” Zipf proposed a model 
that is based on the positive correlation between migration and the difference between two 
economies, and the negative correlation between migration and the distance of the two 
geospatial locations.17 This model became known as the basic gravity model of migration. 
As a refinement of the basic model, scholars introduced other variables to mitigate 
sampling biases and provide a better fit for the observed behavior.18 This is called the 
augmented gravity model, and it acknowledged diaspora as a major factor of migration. 
Critiques of the gravity models claim that the related regression models can be potential 
sources of biased result. 
Migration systems theories came into existence based the assumed relationship 
between the globalization process and international migration.19 Based on the systems 
theory, Douglas S Massey in 1990 described migration systems as a self-perpetuating 
phenomenon caused by the creation of social and economic structures that keep up a certain 
 
15 George J. Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration,ˮ The International Migration 
Review 23, no. 3 (1989): 457–85, https://doi.org/10.2307/2546424. 
16 Migali et al., International Migration Drivers, 15. 
17 George Kingsley Zipf, “The P1 P2/D Hypothesis: On the Intercity Movement of Persons,ˮ 
American Sociological Review 11, no. 6 (1946): 677–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2087063. 
18 Örn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (New York, NY: 
Springer New York, 2013), 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2116-0. 
19 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York, NY: Academic Press, 
1974); and Wilbur Zelinsky, “The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition,” Geographical Review 61, no. 2 
(1971): 219–49, https://doi.org/10.2307/213996. 
 
5 
level of flow even though “the structural determinants that prompted it in the first place no 
longer exert their force.”20 
In 2011, Oliver Bakewell et al. highlighted the relevance of emergent patterns of 
migration systems. They focused on the question of why initial migration movements give 
rise to self-perpetuating behavior in one case and not in the other.21 The authors identified 
three shortcomings of the prior migration systems studies: (1) while migration systems 
theory was engaged with self-perpetuation behavior and reinforcing loops, it could not 
explain the emergent patterns that lead to self-perpetuation behavior; (2) the theory also 
disregarded the conceptual analysis and the exogenous factors; (3) finally, it provided little 
understanding of internal mechanisms and paid little attention to balancing loops and 
limiting factors that inherently characterize the systems behavior.22 
Built on the development of migration theories, several studies apply systemic 
approaches to understanding migration to the United States, but I found no research based 
on a systemic analysis of illegal migration to the EU. Also, while researchers recognize the 
decision to migrate as a collective (family) decision, they hypothesize rational actors who 
make decisions based on relevant knowledge of destination countries and a rational cost-
benefit calculation.23 Based on my knowledge, no study applies system dynamics 
modeling to represent the system’s behavior. This thesis aims to fill this gap by exploring 
the system’s behavior and the interconnectedness of its parts. Also, while migration 
scholars assume rational actors in the system, this thesis hypothesizes a strong social 
influence and biased perception that leads to mass migration through the Mediterranean 
region. 
 
20 Douglas S. Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of 
Migration,” Population Index 56, no. 1 (1990): 8, https://doi.org/10.2307/3644186. 
21 Oliver Bakewell, Hein De Haas, and Agnieszka Kubal, “Migration Systems, Pioneer Migrants and 
the Role of Agency,” Journal of Critical Realism 11, no. 4 (January 2012): 413–37, https://doi.org/
10.1558/jcr.v11i4.413. 
22 Bakewell, De Haas, and Kubal, 6–7. 
23 Arcadius Kahan, “Economic Opportunities and Some Pilgrims’ Progress: Jewish Immigrants from 
Eastern Europe in the U.S., 1890–1914,” The Journal of Economic History 38, no. 1 (1978): 235–51; and 
Terance J. Rephann and Coomaren P. Vencatasawmy, “Determinants of the Spatial Mobility of 
Immigrants: Evidence from Sweden’, The Review of Regional Studies 30, no. 2 (2000): 189–213. 
 
6 
C. DATA SOURCES  
The primary data source regarding the volume and tendencies of illegal migration 
is the FRONTEX Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings (IBCs) database.24 This dataset 
consists of the monthly statistics of illegal border crossing by nationalities from 2009 to 
the present. The statistical analyses in Chapter II use open-source datasets of acknowledged 
organizations like the World Bank’s Gross Domestic Products (GDP) per capita dataset, 
Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) database of 
the University of North Carolina, or the Polity5 dataset of the Center for Systemic Peace 
and Societal-Systems Research Inc.25 The Human Development Index (HDI) data was 
acquired from the UN HDI database. Georeferenced conflict data was accessed through the 
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset.26  
The fundamental data source for analyzing the cognitive process that leads to the 
decision to migrate (Chapter III) is a 2018 study of the European Commission’s Directorate 
of General Migration and Home Affairs, which examined the communication patterns of 
migrants and asylum seekers in Italy.27 
Social media data for exploring the Perception of Illegal Migration in Destination 
Countries (Chapter IV) was collected using Twitter’s REST Application Programming 
Interface (API) and the R programming language (Rtweet package).28 
The Social Network Analysis (SNA) of the smuggling organizations involved in 
illegal migration (Chapter V) uses data from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
 
24 Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics”; and “World Development Indicators,” 
World Bank, accessed 28 February 2021, https://databank.worldbank.org/
reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD; and ‘Uppsala Conflict Data Program’, Department 
of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed 28 February 2021, https://ucdp.uu.se/; and Mark Gibney et al., 
‘The Political Terror Scale’, 2020, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/About/Contact/; and ‘Polity5 Level’, 
Center for Systemic Peace, accessed 19 March 2021, https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
25 World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” 
26 ACLED, “The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project,” ACLED, accessed 6 April 2021, 
https://acleddata.com/. 
27 Gabriella Sanchez et al., A Study of the Communication Channels Used by Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers in Italy, with a Particular Focus on Online and Social Media (European Commission, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.2837/77854. 
28 “Twitter API,” Twitter, 23 October 2020, https://developer.twitter.com/en/products/twitter-api. 
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(UNODC) Case Law Database, UN Security Council Sanction List, and studies of the post-
Qadhafi civil wars in Libya, while the SNA of individuals involved in smuggling 
operations (Chapter VI) uses relational data from the N. 1874/2015 / DDA RG court file 
of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Palermo District, Italy.29 
D. SCOPE AND METHOD 
This thesis considers illegal mass migration in the Central Mediterranean as a 
systemic strategic problem. In a complex system, the system’s output is characterized by 
the behaviors of interdependent parts, where no part can change its behavior without 
affecting the system as a whole.30 Consequently, analyzing a part of the system without 
the notion of the containing whole leads to loss of sight of some essential properties of the 
system as a whole.31 Observing a complex system from one perspective produces an 
imperfect representation of the reality. As Hester and Adams claim, a perfect understanding 
of a complex systemic problem requires an infinite number of perspectives.32 
Consequently, we may never have perfect understanding of a complex systemic problem, 
but the more perspective gained, and the more time provided for the observation, the better 
our understanding. Based on this notion, the main intention of this thesis is to gain as many 
aspects of system behavior as possible within the given limitations. The following chapters 
examine different parts of the migration system using qualitative and quantitative analyses 
to reveal different perspectives and underlying characteristics of the whole system, just like 
slicing an orange vertically or cross sectionally reveals inherently different aspects of the 
 
29 “Case Law Database,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed 22 July 2020, 
https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/v3/som/cldb/index.html?lng=en; and “Security Council Committee 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011) Concerning Libya,” United Nations Security Council, 
accessed 12 September 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials/summaries; and 
Pap, Gábor, “Milíciák Líbiában: Hatásuk Az Ország Biztonsági Helyzetére, Bel- És Külpolitikájára 
[Militias in Libya: Their Impact on the Security Situation, Interior and Foreign Policy of the Country]” 
(master’s thesis, University of Public Service, 2019); Glauco II, Case n. 7472/15 R.N. G.I.P, 2015, 
https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/criminalgroupcrimetype/ita/2015/case_n._747215_r.n._g.i.p._-
_glauco_ii.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc , accessed 28 April 2021. 
30 Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future, 15. 
31 Ackoff, 17. 
32 Patrick T. Hester and Kevin Adams, Systemic Thinking: Fundamentals for Understanding Problems 
and Messes, Topics in Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality (Cham Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing, 2014), 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07629-4. 
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of the same object.33 This thesis applies a set of quantitative and qualitative analyses that 
focuses on the Central Mediterranean migration route as one of the most frequented 
smuggling areas of the world. This migration route directly targets the southern flank of 
NATO and the European Union, posing a severe security challenge alongside the grave 
humanitarian crisis. 
I also consider the illegal migration system as an open, complex adaptive system 
(CAS) that generates self-organizing emergent patterns as a response to environmental 
change. Therefore, its behavior is not understandable without recognition of the 
interactions between the parts and their containing environment. The political and socio-
economic dynamics of origin and target countries, the economically and politically 
motivated influence of EU decision making, the activity of violent extremist organizations, 
and the cooperation between EU and donor/transit countries are all parts of the containing 
environment (exogenous system). On the other hand, IBCs, smuggling networks, NGO 
activity, security threat level, border protection, and the diaspora within the EU are all parts 
of the endogenous system (Figure 1). 
 




The causal loop diagram represents only causal relationships between system variables. Polarity 
notation was assigned to each link such that a positive notation represents a reinforcing (i.e., same) 
causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and a negative notation 
represents a balancing (i.e., opposite) causal relationship. The setup of the causal loop diagram is 
explained in detail in Chapter VII. 
Figure 1. Causal Loop Diagram—Illegal Migration 
Chapter II applies quantitative statistical and geospatial analysis using a multiple 
regression model to explore the relationship between socio-economic drivers and system 
output (IBCs). Chapter III provides a qualitative analysis of the cognitive process of 
migrants focusing on the perception of European countries and the decision-making 
process that leads a person to migrate. This chapter hypothesizes that strong social 
influence and social diffusion is shaping the perception of the susceptible populations that 
triggers the decision to migrate for millions of people. Chapter VI uses text and sentiment 
analysis on a Twitter communication network to reveal the perception of illegal migration 
in European societies and its underlying patterns. Chapter V applies SNA to explore the 
social structure of smuggling organization in the Central Mediterranean. It highlights the 
prominent role of the Eritrean Smuggling Group. Thus, Chapter VI uses SNA to explore 
the characteristics and structural vulnerabilities of this particular smuggling organization. 
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Chapter VII applies system theory to synthetize the findings of the previous analyses. It 
considers the systemic nature of the problem to suggest three strategic options that could 
have a decent probability of succeeding. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
Data collection was predominantly limited to English language open-source data; 
therefore, the fit of the applied models and their predictions can be further developed by 
including more detailed information or classified data sources. The system is embedded 
into a dynamically changing and turbulent environment; therefore, any application of the 
proposed techniques requires the refinement of the models based on updated data. This 
thesis is primarily focusing on the security aspects of the illegal migration. While the 
political aspect is also an inherent part of the problem, I included it only to the extent that 
is necessary to understand the behavior of the system. This thesis does not recommend 
influence activity against any civil societies within the area of interest. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis considers illegal mass migration as a complex systemic problem on the 
strategic level. It also acknowledges that any observation of the system’s behavior is just 
an imperfect representation of the reality.34 While gaining perfect understanding is 
impossible, the more systemic parts are analyzed, and the more aspects that are included, 
the better our understanding of the problem will be. Therefore, this thesis applies a series 
of quantitative and qualitative analyses as each reveal different aspects and properties of 
the migration system as a whole. Finally, systems theory provides the theoretical basis to 





34 Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future. 
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II. DRIVERS OF MIGRATION—A STATISTICAL AND 
GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter applies statistical analysis to consider the main drivers and underlying 
factors of illegal mass migration in the Mediterranean region. The analysis explores the 
relationship between socio-economic drivers and IBCs (as the system’s output). The 
chapter is divided into three main sections. The first is a regional overview exploring the 
main dynamics of the migration system. The second is a prescriptive statistical analysis 
that aims to identify the driving factors of the illegal migration in the Mediterranean Basin 
by using a multiple regression model. The final section is a geospatial analysis that places 
the drivers into geospatial context focusing on the Central Mediterranean. 
A. DATA AND METHOD 
Both the regional overview and the statistical part focus on the number of IBCs as 
the main indicator of illegal migration level. IBC data were retrieved from the Frontex 
database.35 
The statistical analysis aims to explain the change in the number of IBCs by 
considering the following independent variables:  
• Population /country of origin/ 
• GDP per capita /country of origin/ 
• Armed conflicts /country of origin/ 
• Diaspora count within the EU 
• Unemployment Rate /country of origin/ 
• Human Development Index (HDI) /country of origin/ 
• Polity level /country of origin/ 
• PTS /country of origin/ 
 
35 Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics.“ 
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• Distance between the capitals /origin-destination/ 
We can hypothesize that an increased level of armed conflict, diaspora count, 
unemployment, and PTS leads to an increase in number of IBCs, while GDP per capita, 
HDI, polity level, and distance negatively correlate with IBCs. The statistical analysis uses 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) model to explore the explore the relationship between 
independent variables and number of IBCs. Referring to the European Commission’s 
International Migration Drivers Report, I selected those statistically significant drivers that 
might also have regional implication in the Central Mediterranean region.36 
GDP per capita, Unemployment Rate, and Population data were collected from the 
World Bank database.37 
Level of armed conflict was collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and 
measured by the fatalities of armed conflicts in the respective country.38 
Diaspora within the EU is measured by the Eurostat Migration and Migrant 
Population dataset.39 
The HDI data was acquired from the UN HDI database. It measures a country’s 
“average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean 
of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.”40 
Polity levels were acquired from the Polity5 dataset of the Center for Systemic 
Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc.41 The dataset assigns a polity level between -
10 and 10 to every country, where -10 is a total autocracy while 10 is a mature democracy. 
War-torn countries with no effective government like Syria or Libya qualify as 0. 
 
36 Migali et al., International Migration Drivers. 
37 World Bank, “World Development Indicators.“ 
38 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Uppsala Conflict Data Program.“ 
39 Eurostat, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.“ 
40 “Human Development Index,” Human Development Reports, UN Human Development 
Programme, accessed 6 April 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. 
41 Center for Systemic Peace, “Polity5 Level.“ 
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PTS data were retrieved from the database of the University of North Carolina.42 
This database describes the violation of basic human rights by agents of the state in the 
respective country on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 referring to countries governed by rule of 
law and 5 to large-scale violation of human and political rights. PTS data is based on the 
annual human rights reports of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. 
Department of State. For estimating the model, I am using the mean values of the three 
reports. 
Distance data were acquired by the CEPII dataset measured between the capital of 
the country of origin and Rome as a reference point.43 The analysis applies 95% confidence 
level. 
B. REGIONAL OVERVIEW 
Migration between North Africa and Italy shows an annual pattern where the peak 
lies between May and October, while IBCs reach the annual minimum around January of 
each year (Figure 2). The Mediterranean Basin is divided into Western, Central, and 
Eastern routes. The unprecedented peak in volume of illegal migration in 2015 was most 
prevalent along the Eastern Mediterranean route, but the entire Mediterranean region was 
affected to some extent. The EU-Turkey Agreement, which came into effect on 20 March 
2016, resulted in a significant drop in illegal migrants’ numbers along the Western Balkans 
and Eastern Mediterranean routes. 
The agreement triggered an increase in the number of IBCs in the Central 
Mediterranean, however, which became the most frequented migration route to the 
European Union in the same year. We have witnessed similar tendencies when the 
combined efforts of the Italian Government and the international community resulted in an 
80% drop in the Central Mediterranean region in 2018, but the Western Mediterranean 
route experienced a great migratory pressure in the same year. In 2019, when both Central 
and Western routes experienced a decreased number of IBCs, seemingly the bulk of 
 
42 Mark Gibney et al., “The Political Terror Scale.“ 




migratory pressure shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean route. To sum up, this observation 
highlights the fluid characteristic of the overall migratory flow in the Mediterranean region. 
Locally applied policies and bilateral agreements shift the migratory pressure from one 
path to the other while barely impacting the volume of the overall flow. 
 
Figure 2. Migratory Flow in the Mediterranean (May 2016–June 
2020)44 
Notably, the SARS-CoV-2 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) shutdown in the EU 
countries serves as evidence that a unitary approach and enhanced border protection can 
halt the migration (despite the former viewpoint of migrant scholars).45 As shown in Figure 
3, the border control measures implemented due to the coronavirus also had the side effect 
of reducing unlawful border crossings to almost zero. During this time, the EU had the 
lowest number of IBCs since 2010. This section established the main dynamics of the 
 
44 Adapted from Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics.“ 
45 Clare Cummings et al., Why People Move: Understanding the Drivers and Trends of Migration to 




illegal migration in the Mediterranean Basin; the following section explores the socio-
economic drivers of illegal migration. 
 
Figure 3. Impact of COVID-19 in the Mediterranean (September 
2019–June 2020)46 
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS—DRIVERS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION 
Understanding why people migrate is paramount for predicting tendencies of illegal 
migration and analyzing the possible effects of migration policies. Consequently, drivers 
of illegal migration are a central concern for security planning and policy making. This set 
of analyses uses multiple regression to identify potential drivers of illegal migration and 
explain the relative importance for each independent variable. 
The dependent variable is the base ten logarithm of IBCs by nationalities. The 
independent variables are established in Section II.A.47 The observation period is between 
 
46 Adapted from Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics.“ 
47 Marie McAuliffe, Binod Khadria, and Céline Bauloz, World Migration Report 2020 (Geneva, 
Switzerland: UN International Organization for Migration, 2019), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/
files/wmr_2020.pdf; and Elisa Mosler Vida and Jasper Dag Tjaden, Global Migration Indicators 2018 




2014 and 2018. The analysis considers the top 50 countries that contribute the most to the 
total number of IBCs. I excluded South American, Southeast Asian, and European donor 
countries to focus the scope on the Central Mediterranean region. The model applies a one-
year lag in respect of diaspora data, as we can assume time delay between the initial social 
influence that contribute to the decision to migrate and the time of arrival. Referring to 
Table 1, the OLS model estimates the following relationship between the number of IBCs 
and the independent variables (driving factors): 
Table 1. Regression Table 
 log(IBCs+1) 
log(Population o) -0.105 (0.117) 
log(GDP per capita o) -0.084 (0.230) 
log(Armed conflicts o) 0.058 (0.054) 
log(Diaspora t-1) 0.789*** (0.082) 
log(Unemployment o) 0.522*** (0.194) 
Human development index o -7.544*** (1.966) 
Polity level o -0.074*** (0.024) 
Political terror scale o 0.074 (0.198) 
log(Distance o-t) -0.726*** (0.263) 





Log Likelihood -458.882 
* p < 0.1;   ** p < 0.05;   *** p < 0.01 
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Referring to the regression table, five factors are statistically significant. These are 
diaspora count, unemployment, human development index, polity level, and distance.  
There is enough statistical evidence to infer a moderate positive relationship (0.52) 
between the diaspora count and number of IBCs, and a weak positive relationship (0.28) 
between the unemployment rate of the country of origin and number of IBCs.  
The analysis also provides statistical evidence to infer weak negative relationships 
(0.21; 0.16; 0.17) between HDI, polity level, distance as independent variables, and the 
number of IBCs as dependent variable. 
The model indicates weak positive relationships between levels of armed conflicts 
and political terror scale (0.35; 0.38) with IBCs, while it shows weak negative relationship 
(0.23) between GDP per capita and IBCs. None of these factors are statistically significant, 
however, although that does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between the 
abovementioned factors and number of IBCs. It also can be a result of non-linear behavior 
in respect of these factors.  
D. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
Geospatial analysis places the statistical analysis into a context that highlights 
geographic patterns, which helps us to understand why migrants chose specific routes 
instead of others. As Libya accounted for most of the illegal migrants in the Central 
Mediterranean in the observation period, the scope is somewhat gravitated to this county. 
The presence of low if any governmental control, the diverse network of militias and 
smuggling groups, and an emergent war economy set the condition for a successful 
migration network across Libya.  
In Qadhafi’s absence, the balance of power within Libya dissolved from a 
centralized, autocratic government into decentralized control by various militia groups no 
longer aligned by the threat of a common enemy. This absence of any centralized 
government allowed the different militia groups to establish businesses based on the 
transportation of migrants seeking a better economic life as they leave countries dominated 
by decades of armed conflict. Combining the ACLED and United Nations Social Indicator 
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data offers a glimpse into the scale of the conflict events and demographic indicators that 
may be related. Figures 4 and 5 show the regional armed conflict attacks in North Africa 
from the 10 years before Qadhafi’s ousting and the nine years after. 
 
Figure 4. Conflict Attack Events 2000–201048 
 




Figure 5. Conflict Attack Events 2012–202049 
Geospatial and temporal analysis of these data suggest the surrounding populations 
were influenced by the nearby conflict and likely sought an environment with not only 
significantly lower levels of armed conflict but better economic opportunity as well. 
According to the last five years of data, populations in the North Africa region’s 
surrounding countries experienced tremendous conflict and subsequent fatalities (Figure 
6). These factors likely produced the migratory behaviors exhibited within the populations 
as conflicts have been proven to be a factor of migration. Figure 6 shows the regional 
conflict fatalities from grouped by size. Along with conflict conditions in the region, 
several economic factors offer suggestions that may help understand why migratory 
populations often choose Libya as the country of choice for migration. 
 
 




Figure 6. Armed Conflict Event Fatalities 2015–202050 
Continuing geospatial analysis of the region, I merged World Bank Development 
indicators with the previous dataset. GPS coordinates aligned the data with the UN Social 
Index shapefile. Figure 7 shows GDP per capita for each country. 
 




Figure 7. GDP per Capita, 202051 
This data suggests that of all the countries in the North Africa region, Libya has the 
highest GDP per capita, which would attract migrants from significantly lower-income 
areas seeking economic means to travel to Europe. Those looking to migrate, specifically 
to Europe, likely choose Libya after departing an area of high conflict, while others merely 
looking to escape the turmoil brought by conflict may seek a country less disturbed by 
warring factions. Next, the Center for Systemic Peace database provided polity data for the 
region. Polity data provides a reference to democracy levels offered by qualities of 
democratic and autocratic governing institutions. The governments are given a score on a 
scale ranging from -9 to 10, which corresponds to fully institutionalized autocracies, such 
as North Korea, all the way to formal democratic governments, like the United States. 
 
51 Adapted from World Bank, “World Development Indicators.“ 
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Figures 8 and 9 show polity levels and PTS for the region. Referring to the polity levels, 
code -77 is assigned to countries with no effective governance (for example, in a state of 
civil war). 
 










Figure 9. PTS 201853 
As the polity data show, the areas surrounding Libya all have some form of 
government control. The highest democratic government score in the region is found by 
Tunisia, which ranks relatively high on the democratic institution scale, suggesting that the 
rule of law, effective border control, and democratic policies contribute to the quality of 
life. Other countries in the region show moderate autocratic control, which suggests 
centralized control provided by a dictatorship with the absence of a third party to enforce 
any policy decision, preventing even militia groups engaging in migrant smuggling from 
operating within these regions. However, looking again at Libya and the central question 
for this research, Libya’s polity score is 0, indicating that neither a democratic institution 
nor an autocratic dictatorship controls the country’s political mechanisms. Without any 
 
53 Adapted from Mark Gibney et al., “The Political Terror Scale.“ 
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form of the formalized institutions of law or control by a dominating authority, the militia 
groups left behind by the civil war of 2011 have been left to do as they please within their 
fragmented silos. This “lawlessness” or self-policing by the various factions has driven a 
new business model within the country, allowing militias to engage in migrant smuggling 
as a means of making money.54 
Interestingly, a significant decrease in the illegal migrant flow from Libya has 
occurred since 2017 as General Haftar’s troops took control the southwestern part of the 
country and disrupted important migrant smuggling routes and hubs (e.g., by the seizure 
of Shaba). This environmental change triggered a self-organizing pattern within the 
migrant smuggling network that resulted in the activation of Tunisian smuggling routes. 
Tunisia became the most prevalent transit country in 2018, and Algeria followed in 2020.55 
E. DISCUSSION 
The regression model provides statistical evidence about the importance of socio-
economic and socio-political factors that lead to a higher level of migration, such as 
unemployment rate, HDI, and polity level. Moreover, the presence of diaspora in one of 
the EU countries is highlighted as a major factor of illegal migration. Diaspora count shows 
the highest correlation (0.51) with number of IBCs comparing to the other variables in the 
model. 
Unsurprisingly, distance as a factor of migration is also statistically significant, but 
the correlation with IBCs is relatively low (0.17), indicating that other factors often 
dominate over the intuitive notion of distance between country of origin and EU countries.  
On the other hand, there is not enough statistical evidence to claim a relationship 
between IBCs and GDP per capita, level of armed conflict, or PTS. However, a lack of 
statistical evidence does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between these 
 
54 Maggie Michael, Lori Hinnant, and Renata Brito, “Making Misery Pay: Libya Militias Take EU 
Funds for Migrants,” AP News, 30 December 2019, sec. Europe, https://apnews.com/article/europe-united-
nations-tripoli-ap-top-news-international-news-9d9e8d668ae4b73a336a636a86bdf27f. 




factors at all. A number of qualitative and quantitative studies infer a strong relationship 
between illegal migration and all of the abovementioned drivers.56 But why does recent 
analysis find no statistical significance for those drivers? The complex and non-linear 
behavior of the system provides a possible explanation: the high number of interacting 
factors and self-organizing behavior of the system generate patterns and probabilistic 
behaviors, but linear (causal) relationships are often masked by the time delay and 
interrelated feedback loops. 
For example, the study of the Joint Research Center of the European Commission 
highlights non-linearities between GDP per capita and the number of migrants.57 The 
authors divided the countries into three groups according to their economic power: low-, 
medium-, and high-income countries. They identified different dynamics of general 
migration with the respect of GDP per capita for countries with different income levels. 
While GDP per capita shows no relationship with migration in low-income countries, a 
higher level of GDP increases migration in medium-income countries and decreases it in 
high-income countries. The authors describe these dynamics as an inverse U-shaped curve, 
where an increase in GDP per capita results in an increased level of migration in a short 
term, while it decreases over the medium and long run. Framing it another way, we could 
say that the dynamics between GDP and migration show a somewhat goal-seeking 
behavior, where a certain threshold level generates the highest number of illegal migrants. 
When GDP per capita is below this threshold level, the relationship is positive and an 
increase of GDP per capita produce higher IBCs. On the other hand, when GDP is higher 
than the threshold, the relationship turns into negative and the higher the GDP per capita 
the lower the number of IBCs of the same nationalities. We could infer that this threshold 
level is between $1,100 and $1,500 per capita per year along the Central Mediterranean 
migratory route. We might think of it as a probabilistic factor, where a country with the 
GDP per capita between $1,100 and $1,500 has the highest probability to trigger mass 
 
56 Migali et al., International Migration Drivers; and Vida and Tjaden, Global Migration Indicators 
2018. 
57 Migali et al., International Migration Drivers, 40. 
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migration, while above or below this level the probability to migrate is generally decreased 
given that every other factor is constant. 
We might also think of armed conflicts as a probabilistic factor of illegal migration 
(and migration generally). By plotting the level of armed conflicts over number of IBCs, 
we can see a clear positive relationship between the two variables for those nations who 
suffer from armed violence; a number of countries produce high level of IBCs without any 
armed conflicts, however. We can argue that a higher level of violence triggers a higher 
number of IBCs. On the other hand, a higher level of IBCs obviously does not necessarily 
correlate with high level of armed conflicts as several other factors can cause the same 
level of migration. This characteristic prevents the regression model to indicate statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables, but based on the data analysis, we 
should consider armed conflicts as one of the most powerful factors of migration. This 
observation correlates with notions of migrant scholars, who claim armed conflict as a 
fundamental reason to migrate.58 
Similarly, PTS shows a general tendency toward higher PTS coupled with higher 
IBCs, although the relationship is somewhat masked as PTS 2.5 produces higher IBCs than 
a linear relationship would justify. As a result, we should accept PTS as a probabilistic 
factor, where a higher level of PTS increases the probability to migrate.  
Geospatial analysis highlighted how social-economic factors and instability shape 
migratory routes. The patterns of high-intensity conflicts and low HDI pushed a large 
number of illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan countries toward Libya. While Libya has 
large uncontrolled territories and a war-torn governmental control, it also has relatively 
high GDP per capita that supports an extended militia ecosystem and provides resources 
for smuggling activity. These factors facilitated an emergent smuggling network that 
promotes large-scale illegal movement toward the European Union. This network had been 
partially disrupted by the 2014–2018 civil war and bilateral agreement between European 
countries and one of the Libyan governing powers (GNA), however. As a result, the 
 
58 Justin Schon, “Motivation and Opportunity for Conflict-Induced Migration: An Analysis of Syrian 




smuggling network adapted to the changing environment and shifted the main migratory 
paths to Tunisia, then Algeria. This behavior is clear indication of self-organizing behavior 
and emergent patterns of migrant smuggling networks. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
According to the statistical analysis, we can accept the hypothesis in respect of 
diaspora count, unemployment rate, HDI, polity level, and distance. Statistical evidence 
shows that an increase in diaspora count and unemployment results in an increased level 
of IBS, while an increase in HDI, polity level, and distance correlate with a decreased level 
of IBCs. GDP per capita, armed conflicts, and PTS are not statistically significant, but we 
can interpret these variables as probabilistic factors based on further analysis. We can claim 
that a higher level of armed conflict and PTS increase the probability to migrate. On the 
other hand, plotting GDP per capita over IBCs shows a somewhat goal-seeking behavior, 
where GDP level of $1,100–$1,500 produces the higher number of IBCs, while either 
higher or lower GDP decreases the probability to migrate. 
Geospatial analysis highlighted that social-economic factors and instability shape 
migratory routes and result in the fluid characteristics of migration flow. The analysis also 
highlights the emergent patterns of smuggling networks as a response to the exogenous 
(environmental) factors. The non-linearities and adaptive, self-organizing behavior are 
indicators of the systemic nature of migration. 
 
28 




III. SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND COGNITIVE DOMAIN OF 
MIGRANTS 
While the statistical analysis (Chapter II) identified the main factors of illegal 
migration, this chapter aims to analyze the cognitive process that leads to the decision to 
migrate. According to the global sample of Gallup’s World Poll between 2015 and 2017, 
15% of the adult population of the world (more than 750 million people) is willing to 
migrate, while only 1.1% made actual preparations to do so.59 But what drives the decision 
to migrate? As decision making is a cognitive process, it is inherently subtle and could be 
subject to social influence, social contagion, and cognitive biases that together shape the 
perception of migrant populations. This analysis focuses on the information that the 
decision is based upon, the source of the information, and the possible social influences 
that shape the pseudo-environment of the migrants. 
As Walter Lippmann argues, “the real environment is altogether too big, too 
complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.”60 Consequently, human cognition 
establishes oversimplified mental models of the reality and acts upon them regardless of 
the accuracy of the representation. We might question whether the decision to migrate is 
based on a rational cost-benefit calculation or is a result of a biased mental model. What 
social and psychological factors impel some to migrate, and what differences exist between 
the actual and perceived environment of potential migrants? More importantly, what are 
the possible sources of the disparities between the actual and perceived environment? 
 
59 Neli Esipova, Rajesh Srinivasan, and Julie Ray, “Global Desires to Migrate: Trends in Global 
Migration and Migration Policy,” in Adjusting to a World in Motion: Trends in Global Migration and 
Migration Policy, ed. Douglas J. Besharov and Mark H. Lopez (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 21–57, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190211394.003.0002; and Neli Esipova, Anita 
Pugliese, and Julie Ray, “More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could,” Gallup, 10 
December 2018, sec. World, https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx; 
and Vida and Tjaden, Global Migration Indicators 2018, 33. 




A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
As Lippmann explains, “whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it 
were the environment itself.”61 Humans are biologically, geographically, and temporally 
incapable of sensing the world in its entirety, due to its complex and erratic nature. As our 
cognition is not capable to process this complexity, we reconstruct the reality in our mental 
models as a simplified representation of the environment.62 As a result, people may act in 
ways that do not “rationally” conform to what the situation logically would require. 
Moreover, if someone has no direct experience in a particular situation, his mind applies a 
created mental image to generate feeling as the basis of the reaction.63 Lippmann refers to 
this imperfect representation of the reality as the pseudo environment, which is formed as 
an interaction between the human mind and the real environment.64 
This pseudo environment is characterized by the state of mind, previous knowledge, 
and the sensory ways as we receive environmental stimuli. The dynamic model of situated 
cognition by Shattuck and Miller argues that sensors (including human sensors) perceive 
only a portion of reality; moreover, the array of sensors and the related technological 
system transfer only a subset of all available data.65 In this uncertain environment, we tend 
to seek patterns based on previous experiences. The incoming data is propagated through 
different lenses that may or may not change the information content. The data might be 
filtered by the array of sensors (our attention), the cultural and social factors, and the state 
of mind (emotions, psychological factors).  
Tversky and Kahneman found that human cognition relies on heuristics when faced 
with complex and uncertain problems.66 While these heuristics are useful and necessary 
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for rapid decision making, they might serve as a basis for cognitive biases that lead to 
severe judgmental errors and poor decision making. In addition to the imperfect perception, 
human cognition tends to fill in the blanks based on previously experienced patterns.67 
Consequently, human cognition processes only a portion of the already reduced and 
probably misrepresented dataset. In other words, humans act upon what they perceive to 
be true even if there is a significant difference between the perceived image and the real 
environment. 
The Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations published by the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff describes the information environment as an aggregate of three interrelated 
and continuously interacting dimensions: physical, information, and cognitive.68 The 
cognitive dimension is the space where “information processing, perception, judgment, and 
decision making” occur.69 While the concept of cognitive dimension is more abstract than 
the already recognized warfighting domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber), more and more 
scholars urge the consideration of cognitive space as an operational domain.70 The 
publication of the Reflection Group to the NATO Secretary General recommended 
development of “capabilities for operating in the cognitive and virtual dimensions.”71 
Considering the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on the changing nature of 
conflicts, we can argue that the concept of the cognitive domain is one of the most 
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dynamically developing areas in security thinking.72 Therefore, considering this factor is 
paramount for further analyzing illegal mass migration. 
B. LIMITED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EUROPE 
According to the study of the European Commission’s Directorate of General 
Migration and Home Affairs in 2018, we can claim that the migrants’ knowledge of Europe 
is somewhat limited and distorted.73 The study surveyed 686 migrants (including illegal 
migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees) who arrived in Italy in the second half of 2017. 
The majority of the respondents originated from Sub-Saharan Africa, north of the Equator. 
The gender ratio was 90% male and 10% female, while the vast majority (96%) of the 
respondents were between the ages of 16 and 34. 
The study highlights that 73% of the surveyed migrants had little if any knowledge 
of any European country upon arrival. “In fact, even among those who were able to provide 
the name of a specific country, knowledge of its location and/or dynamics was scant.”74 It 
is worth noting that there were significant differences between nationalities in this regard. 
While approximately 70% of migrants from Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria could not name a 
specific destination country, only 23% of Tunisian migrants could not.75 This notion 
correlates with the geographical proximity, the higher polity level, and the higher HDI of 
Tunisia compared to Sub-Saharan countries (Chapter II—Geospatial Analysis). Also, 
migrants who had friendship or kinship ties to any EU member country were most likely 
to name a specific country of destination.76 This demonstrates the significance of knowing 
the source of information and the role of social structure in the decision-making process. 
 
72 NATO Science & Technology Organization, Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040 (Brussels, 
Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/
190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf. 
73 Sanchez et al., Communication Channels Used by Migrants. 
74 Sanchez et al., 15. 
75 Sanchez et al., 16. 
76 Sanchez et al., 17. 
 
33 
C. SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
According to the European Commission’s survey, the main source of information 
for migrants is the kinship and friendship network. While migrants prefer face-to-face 
communication before leaving their home country and during the journey, they also apply 
social media and telephone communication to keep in contact with friends and relatives 
living in the diaspora.77 During and after the journey, they prefer to communicate with 
fellow migrants from the same ethnic group. The initial movement is often a collective 
decision made by the family in which the individual is embedded. Immediate relatives 
often take the financial burden of the journey; therefore, they are directly involved into the 
decision making in these cases. The migrant smugglers demand a significant amount of 
money in return for their service. They are usually paid for different segments of the 
journey as they are selling modular service for parts of the migratory routes. The 
subsequent payments are often paid by family members using money transfer service or 
middleman process called “hawala method.” As a result, the collective decision-making 
process also could be true for the subsequent phases of the journey: “The decision to leave 
Libya was a collective process. Migrants reported talking with family members, employers 
and co-workers in Libya and in their countries of origin, mainly by phone, to consult them 
about leaving.”78 Interestingly, conditions in Libya were frequently cited as the main factor 
in the decision to travel to Europe, while they were concise and obscure in articulating the 
incentives to leave their home country (making the initial step to migrate).79 
Social media platforms are usually not a means of communicating about illegal 
migrant activity. Smugglers and illegal migrants often use encrypted communication 
platforms like Viber or Whatsapp to discuss the details of the illegal journey.80 
Interestingly, migrants do not see interactions with smugglers negatively. It seems that they 
are well aware of the dangers and the possible exploitations by smugglers; moreover, they 
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mostly accept it as a necessary condition of the journey.81 Also, we can highlight that the 
migrant smuggling network consists of competing groups who are not selling specific 
destinations, rather they provide transportation generally to the territory of the EU. In 
several cases, the smuggling groups put high emphasis on their reputation and credibility 
to gain competitive advantage.82 While they are not the primary source of expectations, 
they are definitely shaping the perception (pseudo-environment) of migrants by effectively 
spreading their narratives through face-to-face communication. The reputation of 
smuggling groups and their contact information is spread through the social network in 
which both the migrants and the smugglers are embedded.  
Interestingly, the first relevant sources of information regarding the destination 
country are humanitarian workers, who encounter migrants only at the final phase of their 
journey.  
The interactions with humanitarian staff, mediators and other migrants, 
along with occasional encounters with Italian citizens, gradually shaped 
migrants’ understandings of Italy and of the way they were perceived in 
Italian society. Focus groups revealed migrants believed the initial 
messages that they would be welcomed by a country and people that 
respected human life, and where they would be unlikely to experience or 
witness the violence that they had seen in Libya or in their countries of 
origin. These notions were repeatedly communicated to migrants upon their 
rescue by ship crews, humanitarian and reception centre staff. Yet, as shown 
in the following section, everyday social interactions often proved 
difficult.83  
Upon arrival, migrants are confronted with a reality that differs from their 
perception of what the reality would be; this often causes confusion, fear, and anxiety. 
“During the first few weeks following their arrival, migrants start to realize that many of 
the initial messages about being welcomed in Italy are not necessarily reflective of the 
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conditions that they face.”84 Later on, migrants become highly anxious about the inability 
to work legally.85 Even if they possess the documentation, they are faced with several 
structural difficulties to be integrated into the labor market. The deprived social situation 
leads to an increased homophily of migrants from the same ethnic group that might 
promote biased information and increase their vulnerabilities. Powerful incentives like 
providing for their families or paying migrant smugglers may trigger desperate steps that 
could drive migrants to the illegal labor market, forcing them into abusive employment 
situations.86 
D. SOCIAL INFLUENCE  
We can argue that the social network in which migrants are embedded plays a key 
role in the decision making of migrants. Before leaving the country of origin, friends and 
family members—either in the home country or in diaspora—provide those norms, beliefs, 
and expectations that inherently influence the behavior of the individual. Moreover, 
possible migrants are directly exposed to smugglers’ narrative. Narratives generally means 
story telling through connected events.87 Based on Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm, 
here it refers to reconstructed signs, symbols, and a good reason to communicate that 
eventually serves as a proxy of propaganda.88 Smugglers are often part of this social 
network either directly or indirectly. Maybe they are living in the same village or the same 
district and everyone knows who they are. Susceptible individuals can easily contact them 
or arrange a face-to-face meeting. Consequently, smugglers can effectively disseminate 
their narrative and influence the perception of migrants. As a result, that narrative might 
become a significant factor in the decision to migrate. In this regard, smugglers, diaspora, 
and migrants are embedded in the same social network that allows both smugglers and 
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relatives/friends to influence the pseudo-environment of possible migrants by spreading 
information about the journey or the destination country. As the survey highlights, the 
disseminated information is often strongly biased or distorted. Every smuggler is interested 
in promoting his business model and persuading susceptible populations to migrate; 
therefore, their narrative can be considered influential messaging. On the other hand, the 
messaging of the diaspora is often based on one-sided incomplete information due to the 
lack of relevant knowledge of the host country and the homophily among migrants of the 
same ethnic group.  
While family members and smuggling groups play a key role before leaving their 
home country, fellow migrants and humanitarian workers become the most trusted sources 
of information during the journey (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. The Most Trusted Sources of Information Among Surveyed 
Migrants89 
 
89 Source: Sanchez et al., Communication Channels Used by Migrants, 23. 
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Migrants mostly interact with their own ethnic group during the journey or in 
detention camps based on national or tribal ethnicity.90 If the discrepancy between the 
expectations and the reality causes fear and anxiety during the integration phase, the 
homophily based on ethnicity will be enduring, causing a closed and cohesive social 
structure that hiders the information exchange with its surrounding environment. In this 
state, the illegally arrived migrants, who are faced with the difficulties of integration or the 
legal consequences of the IBCs, become the diaspora, and now they are spreading their 
anchored and incomplete perceptions to the next wave of illegal migrants.  
We can assume that there is a reinforcing loop in the cognitive domain of the 
migrant population that inherently affects the decision to migrate. This reinforcing loop 
propagates biased and distorted information about the journey and the destination. The 
larger the diaspora of one particular ethnic group, the higher the social influence over 
susceptible population of the donor country, which further strengthens the business model 
of smugglers. As Figure 11 indicates, the dissemination of this information could be very 
fast and widespread considering the capabilities of the Internet and social media platforms. 
As Sanchez et al. found, the Facebook network of the nine Nigerian migrants of the focus 
group consists of a communication network that spans 75 countries with 1,850 nodes.91  
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Figure 11. Two-Mode Networks of Nigerians’ Facebook Friends 
(n=1850; countries=75; individuals=9)92 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We can argue that the decision to migrate is based upon biased and distorted 
information influenced by smuggling groups, home society, and diaspora. Before the first 
move, the primary source of information are friends and family members, especially when 
they are living in one of the EU member countries as diaspora. Later, the fellow migrants 
and humanitarian workers become the most trusted source of information. NGOs and 
humanitarian workers have great responsibility upon sharing relevant and realistic 
information as often they are the first credible source of information regarding the EU. If 
they provide one-sided information about the expectations and possibilities, it increases the 
probability for illegal migrants to get trapped in a deprived and desperate situation.  
 
92 Source: Sanchez et al. 
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While smugglers are secondary sources of expectations, they are capable and highly 
interested in influencing susceptible populations to migrate. Their narratives are playing 
on emotions that construct an unreal image about a distant prosperous place. As possible 
migrants usually have no direct experience regarding European countries, they construct 
their mental images based on the available information. Moreover, their mental models 
tend to fill the information gaps based on previously observed patterns.93 Based on the 
European Commission’s survey, we can infer that the available information upon which 
the mental images are constructed is inherently distorted and possibly biased. Most of the 
surveyed migrants had no prior information about Europe, nor did they consider the 
continent a specific destination. Rather, they were looking for a destination that was far 
enough from their home country. But in that case, who chooses the destination? We might 
raise the question of why do people accept the risk of being kidnapped, raped, or murdered 
without relevant information of the destination and their future? Is it a higher control, or is 
it a self-organizing and emergent pattern? Either way, we can argue that migrants act upon 
a biased perception—a pseudo-environment—that is usually far from the reality. Their 
cognition picks up the distorted and biased information and creates an image by filling in 
the blanks using already familiar patterns. 
 
 
93 Freeman, “Filling in the Blanks.“ 
 
40 




IV. PERCEPTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN DESTINATION 
COUNTRIES 
This chapter explores the different perceptions of illegal mass migration using data 
from the Twitter social media platform, with a special focus on European Union member 
countries. The study aims to use text and sentiment analysis to reveal underlying patterns 
of the communication network. 
A. DATA AND METHODS 
This analysis uses Twitter data drawn through Twitter’s REST API.94 Specifically, 
this examination leveraged the R rtweet package to collect conversations related to relevant 
hashtags.95 Hashtags were selected in terms of their relevance to the overall conversation; 
also, specific topics and Italian-related hashtags were used to focus the scope to the EU 
and the Mediterranean region:  
 
• #migrantcrisis • #migration • #immigrazione
• #matteosalvini • #migranti • #migrationcrisis 
• #migrationeu • #migrationpact • #openborders 
• #profugo 
 
94 Twitter, “Twitter API.“ 




Tweets were pulled and combined by columns into one dataset listing the user ID, 
user name, retweets, quotes, and replies. Binding the datasets together provided a database 
of 14,150 tweets created between 12 and 21 October 2020. The listed attributes provided 
relational data between Twitter accounts where retweets, quotes, or replies to one particular 
tweet qualified as a social tie. The network data were saved as a comma separated file 
(.csv) where ties weight equals one for each instance of interactions. The boundaries of the 
network are described by relation to any of the abovementioned hashtags. An actor 
qualified as part of the network if he or she retweeted, quoted, or replied to any of the 
abovementioned hashtags. As depicted in Figure 12, the described procedure revealed a 
communication network of 8,618 nodes and 11,704 edges (ties).  
 
Figure 12. Twitter Communication Network, Main Weak Component, 
Colored by Hashtags 
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As this analysis aims to explore different perceptions of illegal migration, I apply 
sentiment analysis to this collection of tweets. I am also interested in identifying 
subsequent drivers of clustering and intergroup communication patterns within the 
observed Twitter network. I do this by focusing on the main weak component, which is the 
largest part of the network where every actor is directly or indirectly connected to every 
other actor if we ignore the directions of ties. Weak component is extracted to disregard 
isolates or conversations that are not tied to central discussions. The main reason behind 
selecting the main weak component is twofold. First, as the research focuses on social 
interactions and information flow, isolates and disconnected dyads are not necessary for 
understanding network dynamics. Second, the largest strong component does not capture 
all aspects of interactions and dissemination of the information at the same time. 
Consequently, the topographical measures will be calculated on an undirected network, 
while the study will notify using directed ties in every case when it is justified, for example, 
when exploring social structure within communities. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK 
As European perception of destination countries is an important factor in illegal 
mass migration, this analysis focuses on communication pattern between subclusters. The 
following exploratory analysis can be divided into two parts. The first explores the 
aggregate structure of the main weak component, while the second focuses on modularity 
groups to reveal underlying drivers of clustering. A working hypothesis is that some level 
of correlation exists between the geographical location (tweet location) and the average 
sentiment of the conversation within any given subcluster. 
The network is aggregated by three types of relationships: retweets, quotes, and 
replies, although retweets represent 90.422% of all edges. The weak component consists 
of 4,883 nodes and 6,891 edges with the average distance of 8.016. The topographic 
measures suggest a relatively sparse and dispersed communication network with low 
density (0.0005) and a diameter of 28. Diameter refers to the longest geodesic, which is the 
path that indirectly connects two distant actors using the shortest possible way. A longer 
diameter indicates a decentralized network with higher probability to adapt to a changing 
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environment.96 Network density refers to the level of interconnectedness of the network 
and it is calculated as the total number of ties divided by the total possible ties.97 
Consequently, density score 1.0 indicates a network where every actor is directly tied to 
every other actor. A denser network structure allows for the spread of ideas, information, 
or material resources and facilitate a better enforcement of norms and shared values. 
Degree centralization measures “the extent to which a single actor possess several ties 
while other actors do not.”98 On the other hand, an actor’s centrality score is the count of 
its ties. Centralization is a global measure that refers to the structure of the whole network, 
while centrality score ties to actors within the network. The Conditional Uniformed Graphs 
test (CUGs) confirms the significance of the high degree of centralization score (0.2115). 
The CUG test generates thousands of simulated networks based on a predetermined 
condition (degree centralization in this case) and compares the measure of the observed 
network with the simulated one.99 The test indicates the probability that the selected 
characteristic of the network is formed by random chance (not statistically significant). The 
observed topographical measures indicate a sparse and decentralized network, where a 
small number of highly centralized actors control most of the information flow, while no 
actor has control over the whole network. The degree report confirms the unique 
topographical characteristics of the analyzed Twitter network (Appendix B, Section E). It 
indicates a scale-free network where a low number of actors have numerous ties and thus 
control most of the resources (information, in this case).100 
In the observed network, cohesive subgroups are often structured around central 
nodes where a number of actors are connected by a single edge to the central communicator 
(Figure 13). 
 
96 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic 
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98 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 93. 
99 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 235. 
100 Albert-László Barabási and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks,” Scientific American 288, no. 5 
(2003): 60–69. 
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Figure 13. Twitter Communication Network, Largest Subgroup 
(Louvain – Group 43) 
Unsurprisingly, we can see a high-level correlation between subgroups, languages 
and hashtags (Figure 14), though communication patterns within subgroups cannot be 
explained only by these factors. I apply sentiment analysis by subgroups to gain a better 
understanding of the underlying factors that drive clustering within the network. The aim 
of the sentiment analysis is to capture the group’s shared (average) attitude toward the 
central topic and to highlight those factors that affect this attitude. 
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Figure 14. Twitter Communication Network, Hashtags, Languages, 
and Subgroups 
Subgroups are communities within the network that are interacting closely and 
frequently enough to influence each other and form a distinct subculture.101 Subgroups are 
generally measured by having more ties within the community and fewer between groups 
than a random network structure would justify. I am using the Louvain algorithm for 
detecting subgroups as this is an effective method to apply for large networks and gives 
the best possible grouping for my analytical purpose.102 As depicted in Figure 15, the 
algorithm identified 43 cohesive subgroups of the main component with the normalized 
modularity of 0.88 (modularity = 0.81), indicating a highly clustered network. Modularity 
indicates the cohesion of the subgroups within a network by measuring the number of the 
ties within communities divided by the ties between them. I collapsed the network by each 
subgroup and varied the size of the collapsed nodes by betweenness centrality. Higher 
101 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 109. 
102 Pasquale De Meo et al., “Generalized Louvain Method for Community Detection in Large 




betweenness centrality highlights subgroups with potentially higher control over 
communication flow. Also, a central group with a higher betweenness score has higher 
probability to access novel information. 
 
Figure 15. Twitter Communication Network, Collapsed by Subgroups 
Turning to the analysis of the content of the tweets, most frequent bigrams (pairs 
of words) are depicted in Figure 16. These suggest that the conversations are focusing on 
the political perspective of the migration rather than its humanitarian or security aspects. 
We can assume that the different political approaches toward illegal migration (and 
migration in general) trigger reflections in the country’s society, and this reflection might 




Figure 16. Frequently Used Bigrams 
To explore the general attitude toward the topic by subgroups, I applied sentiment 
analysis to the English language tweets in each subgroup. Where negative sentiment 
predominated, I colored the collapsed nodes red, and in those where positive sentiment 
predominated, I colored the nodes blue. Subgroups where sentiment analysis was not 
available due to other languages are colored gray (Figure 17). We can see that blue nodes 
are often connected to other blue nodes, and red nodes are often connected to other red 
nodes, such as groups 43 and 39.103 A notable exception is group 10, which is almost 
exclusively tied to groups with different sentiment, although this subgroup is very close to 
neutral sentiment value. 
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I assigned a single geographical location to a subgroup if the majority of “retweet 
locations” pointed to a specific country or region, and I applied multiple locations if tweets 
were divided between up to three identifiable locations (Appendix 3). There is a strong 
correlation between geographical location and average sentiment for both positive and 
negative subgroups. The subgroups expressing high negative sentiments are typically tied 
to those countries that are primarily affected by illegal mass migration, while those 
expressing positive sentiment are those tied to countries with secondary movements of 
illegal mass migration. For instance, the Twitter conversation from Spain, Italy, and France 
reflected negative sentiments toward migration, while conversations from Switzerland, 
Malta, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries reflected positive sentiment toward 
migration. 
As frequently used bigrams indicated, political perspective is the primary aspect of 
these conversations. While political leaders of EU member countries agree upon the need 
for a new European Union migration policy that takes the place of the Dublin Regulations, 
the debate over the general approach of the new legislation has continued since 2015. There 
are two conflicting approaches: pro-migration countries like Italy, Spain, France, and 
Germany promote a dissemination system to share the illegal migrants and asylum seekers 
between the 27 EU countries according to an automatic mechanism (compulsory), while 
governments of V4 countries propose to handle the crisis outside of the European 
borders.104 These countries claim that an irresponsible welcome policy and mixed 
signaling from EU leadership foreshadow a humanitarian crisis, as millions of people are 
choosing the deadly journey across the Mediterranean Sea based on very little knowledge 
about the conditions of the destination countries. Interestingly, while frontier countries are 
identifying illegal migration as a severe socio-cultural, economic, and security challenge, 
they promote the compulsory redistribution mechanism within the EU.105 Considering 
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groups with top positive and top negative sentiments, we can conclude that the sentiment 
of subclusters and the political approach of the respective governments do not correlate. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To summarize, this analysis revealed some factors that contribute to different 
perceptions of the illegal mass migration. Conversations are generally saturated by political 
narratives, rather than the security of the humanitarian approach. We could see a high level 
of correlation with geographical location and illegal migration but no linear correlation 
between the political approach of respective governments and the perception of mass 
migration. We can infer a social influence among European societies (characterized by 
intense political debates) that push the conversation toward political messages while 









V. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter explores the social structure of migrant smuggling networks in the 
Central Mediterranean. The observation period spans from 2014 as a reference point 
prior to the 2015 peak until the end of 2019 due to data availability. As Libya was the 
far most prevalent transit country in the region in this period, the scope is naturally 
gravitated toward organizations that facilitate migrant smuggling through Libya. The 
analysis applies data from the UNODC Case Law Database, UN Security Council 
Sanction List, and studies of the post-Qadhafi civil wars in Libya.106 
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This thesis argues that network approach offers a unique and insightful 
perspective of dynamics within a social structure and the cognitive dimension of those 
dynamics. The social structure in which actors are embedded constrains and offers them 
opportunities as well as affecting their behaviors more than pure rational choice models 
typically suggest.107 
1. Social Network Analysis 
SNA is a set of theories and methods that provides a better conceptualization of 
enduring patterns of social ties that helps to understand the constraints, reach, and 
capacity of actors within the network. SNA is based on the notion that nodes 
(individuals, groups, or organizations) are affected by their ties to other actors and the 
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social structure (i.e., networks) in which they are embedded rather than their individual 
attributes.108 
In 1979, Mark Granovetter argued that social network models were a collection 
of methods constructed in “theoretical vacuum” while he urged a coherent theoretical 
framework for SNA.109 In the following decades, network scholars like Stanley 
Wasserman, Katherine Faust, David H. Knoke, Song Yang, James H. Fowler, and 
Nicholas A. Christakis published a set of perspectives and theories of network approach 
that was built on theoretical foundations of early scholars like Granovetter, Milgram, 
and Burt.110 
Sean Everton describes SNA as “a collection of theories and methods that 
assumes that the behavior of actors is profoundly affected by their ties to others and the 
networks in which they are embedded.”111 He also synthetized the assumptions 
underlying these theories and methods: 
• Actors and their related actions are interdependent, rather than 
independent, with other actors. 
• Ties between actors are conduits for the transfer or flow of various 
types of material and/or nonmaterial goods or resources (e.g., funds, 
supplies, information, trust, enmity). 
• Social structures are seen in terms of enduring patterns of ties between 
actors (i.e., social networks). 
• Repeated interactions between actors give rise to social formations 
that take on a life of their own, follow their own logic, and cannot be 
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reduced to their constituent parts even though they remain dependent 
on those parts. 
• An actor’s position in the social structure (i.e., its structural location) 
impacts its beliefs, norms, and observed behavior. 
• Social networks are dynamic entities that change as actors, subgroups 
and ties between actors enter, from, leave, or are removed from the 
network.112 
2. Social Structure 
Social network theory holds that the behavior of social actors is affected by the 
social networks in which they are embedded, and we cannot analyze their actions 
independently of the structure of those networks: “actors’ attitudes, beliefs, intentions, 
behavior, and even their identities are largely determined by their location in the social 
structure.”113 Culture and norms also play an important role. Networks, in fact, are 
constituted by the stories (and the related symbols and norms) that they tell about 
themselves.114 Norms are the shared and accepted ideas that guide how actors interact 
with one another within the social structure. Milgram’s Obedience to Authority 
experiments, Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment, and Sherif’s Robbers Cave 
experiment demonstrate the compelling power of accepted norms on actor behavior.115 
Mark Granovetter also notes that the greater a network’s density, the easier it is to 
enforce the norms of that network.116 Thus, with greater density and cohesion, the 
probability of effective information sharing, monitoring, and mobilizing increases. 
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To illustrate, consider the coercive power of social structure and norms prevalent 
in Nigerian mafia-type organizations. Black Ax, MAPHITE, and Vikings apply secret 
ritual affiliation ceremonies, where candidates drink a drug-based beverage mixed with 
blood, and heavy beatings and other forms of violence are integral aspects of the 
ceremony.117 The ceremony emphasizes values like obedience and loyalty and enhances 
the role of violence in the internal and external life of the social network. In some cases, 
the victims and illegal migrants also go through similar bloody rituals, where they swear 
loyalty to the smuggling organization. The oaths they swear are highly monitored and 
enforced within dense and cohesive cells. These rituals have lasting socio-psychological 
effects that impact the perception of the affiliates and the victims by their transformed 
quasi-social environment. This social situation heavily influences the behavior of the 
actors according to the interest of the group rather than acting out of pure self-interest. 
Since social context impacts behavior, understanding the topography of a network and 
the interactions within it is critical to determine the necessary effect for triggering 
favorable action or inaction. 
3. Social Influence, Social Diffusion 
In their article on social contagion theory, Christakis and Fowler argues that 
actors can spread ideas, norms, and emotions across the social network up to three 
degrees (e.g., a friend of a friend of a friend).118 Even a complex phenomenon like 
obesity can travel across the social structure through various ties. An actor’s beliefs 
concerning obesity can influence not just its friends, but its friends’ friends, and its 
friends’ friends’ friends. Conversely, the actor is also influenced by every other actor 
within the social structure up to three degrees. Christakis and Fowler discovered that the 
strongest effect occurred through reciprocal ties where social distance is a major factor, 
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more so than geographical distance. Nevertheless, crosscutting ties push and pull actors 
in different directions, and the net effect of these ties determines the actual behavior.119 
According to social scientists, social diffusion mostly happens when exogenous 
information and social reinforcement are in play together.120 Another important 
characteristic is how new ideas and norms spread across the social structure. Everton 
and Pfaff define social diffusion as “the outward movement of an innovation (or cultural 
trait) from one source to another.”121 The dynamics of spreading new norms or ideas is 
based on the notion the social actors assess their choices in light of the norms and 
attitudes of other actors.122 The pattern of adopting new ideas follows a normal 
(Gaussian) distribution when the number of adopters plotted over time results a bell-
shaped curve. Early scholars of social diffusion differentiated five categories referring 
to the adoption of an innovation: (1) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, 
(4) late majority, and (5) laggards.123 An interesting notion is that when the proportion 
of adopters achieves a critical mass somewhere between 10 and 20 percent, the diffusion 
turns into a self-reinforcing mechanism that is very difficult to reverse.124  
How does this inform our understanding of illegal migration? We can assume 
that the society of the donor country and diaspora living in a European country 
constitutes a social network, where actors are socially close to each other (kinship and 
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friendship ties) regardless of the physical distance. In that particular case, actors living 
in the diaspora are a source of information that shapes the attitudes and expectation of 
donor societies regarding the European countries and the expected benefits of illegal 
migration. Moreover, this social influence diffuses in the donor societies and, after 
reaching a critical mass, it produces a self-reinforcing behavior. 
4. Strong and Weak Ties 
According to Mark Granovetter, the strength of ties between actors can vary from 
strong to weak within an interconnected social structure.125 “The strength of a tie is a 
(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”126 
In an analysis of how people had secured their current jobs, he found that while strong 
ties are common in highly connected networks where most actors know each other, weak 
ties—characterized by lower frequency of social interaction—are more likely to act as 
“bridges” between such highly connected clusters. 
This leads Granovetter to argue that “whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger 
number of people and travels greater social distance when passed through weak ties 
rather than strong.”127 Since weak ties are more effective at bridging social distance, 
they will have a significant impact on diffusion of information, new ideas, and 
innovations.128 While dense, highly connected clusters with strong ties allow for 
exponential information dissemination within dense clusters of actors, weak ties can 
facilitate the diffusion of new and unique information across clusters. As such, these 
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ties—in certain conditions—play a crucial role in disseminating influential messages 
and measuring indicators of effectiveness.129 
5. Structural Holes 
Ronald Burt expanded upon Granovetter’s theory of weak ties. Noting that 
distinguishing weak from strong ties can be difficult and arguing that strong ties will 
occasionally function as bridges between clusters, Burt focused on identifying the gaps 
between clusters, what he called “structural holes.”130 “Structural holes are 
disconnections or nonequivalencies between players in the arena” that might provide 
access to information, resources, and control.131 Ties bridge structural holes by 
“transmitting unique and nonredundant information across otherwise largely 
disconnected segments of social networks,”132 and “a node has more structural holes if 
it has more nonredundant ties.”133 Thus, actors who are “rich” in structural holes lie in 
positions of brokerage, which allow them to potentially control the flow of resources, 
information, or influence. Therefore, these nodes often became the focal point of 
network-destabilizing strategies and non-kinetic targeting. 
6. Flow 
Stephen Borgatti and Daniel Halgin synthetized these theories in 2011 into what 
they called the network flow model. They argued that weak ties are the best potential 
conduit to insert novel information into a network.134 The authors differentiated state-
type ties and event-type ties, where state-type ties represent relations that have extended 
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continuity over time like kinship ties or perceptual relations, while event-type ties link 
actors over a discrete time period such as participating on the same event. Both types of 
ties represent conduits that permit some measure of flow over the network.135 Here, 
flow is analogous to bonding in that it “aligns and coordinates action, enabling groups 
of nodes to act as a single node, often with greater capabilities.”136 While bonding 
models focus on network coordination, however, Borgatti and Halgin’s flow model 
focuses on how ties function as conduits that disseminate information across the 
network.137 It examines network structure to determine possible outcomes. 
One of the central questions it asks is how often and with what certainty a given 
node receives a particular flow. As the model highlights, isomorphic nodes in similar 
structural positions will produce similar outcomes, but attributes and context might 
significantly impact actual outcomes.138 For this thesis, the network flow model might 
provide valuable insight into network dynamics that can serve as a basis for determining 
possible outcomes to inform and influence operations. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND KEY ACTORS 
After the 2011 anti-Qadhafi uprising, it became apparent that no single authority 
could unify Libya’s political landscape. In 2014, protests began against the elected 
government after it refused to step down by the end of its mandate.139 Armed attacks 
against the elected government launched the first post-Qadhafi civil war between 2014 
and 2018, which forced the House of Representatives (HoR)—the internationally 
recognized governing body at that time—and its armed forces, the Libyan National 
Army (LNA), to flee to Tobruk.140 This move practically created two ineffective rival 
governmental bodies as the General National Congress (GNC) seized control over 
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Tripoli, while the HoR set up its government  in Tobruk, controlling the eastern part of 
the country.141 Although the UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement was signed by 
both the GNC and the HoR on 17 December 2015, establishing the Government of 
National Accord (GNA)—a UN-recognized governing body—the reconciliation failed 
when the HoR withdrew from the newly formed government shortly after the signing 
ceremony. As a result, the rivalry continued as GNA became the internationally 
recognized government, while the Tobruk-based HoR and LNA maintained control of 
the eastern part of the country. The second civil war started in late April 2019 when 
General Haftar—the leader of LNA—launched an extensive military operation to seize 
Tripoli and the Western part of the country to become the only governing authority in 
Libya.142 While the LNA leadership planned a short and decisive offensive against the 
GNA and the fragmented militia groups of the Western territories, the action brought 
into existence an anti-LNA coalition by unifying the scattered militias and criminal 
groups under a GNA umbrella, which resulted in prolonged struggle throughout the 
country. Most of the fragmented and opportunistic militias around Tripoli were unified 
into one sparsely coordinated Alliance under control of the GNA. Some militias—like 
most members of the Zintani militia group—changed sides after the second civil war 
between 2014–2018 and entered the fight by GNA’s side in 2019.143 
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C. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING GROUPS IN 
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN 
Table 2 lists the key organizations involved in the illegal smuggling of migrants, 
while Figure 18 graphs these organizations and ties between them. While the two main 
powers in Libya— the GNA and the LNA—officially oppose migrant smuggling 
activity, both are directly connected to militias involved in smuggling activity. GNA’s 
armed forces constitute a wide variety of opportunistic militia groups unified to counter 
the LNA offensive in April 2019. The GNA militias generally control Libya’s 
northwestern territories, including migrant smuggling hubs like Tripoli, Zawiya, and 
Sabratha. 
 




Table 2. Key Organizations in the Smuggling Network 
 
The topographical metrics of the network (Table 3) indicate that the network is 
decentralized and relatively sparse with large network diameter. As expected, the relatively 
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Italy, Turkey, Qatar, Tebu, 
Tuareg, GNA militias, 
The internationally recognized legislative body of Libya that 




LNA The internationally recognized governmental body between 2012–
2014. After that, HoR was forced to flee Tobruk and recently 
represents the rival government against GNA controlling the 




HoR, France, Russia, Egypt, 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
mixed signal from the U.S.  
Represents the most sophisticated and largest militia group of Libya 
consists of 7.000 men regular force and 18.000 men auxiliary 
militias. LNA serves as the armed forces of HoR; Despite of its 
name, it does not qualify as a national army.146 
NGOs Other NGOs, Smuggling 
Organizations, Italian Coast 
Guard 
Western European NGOs operating vessels to provide 
transportation for illegal migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. 
While the NGO vessels provide humanitarian assistance and 
decrease human suffering, they regularly provide illegal 
transportation across the Sea.147 
Tuareg GNA, Tebu Nomadic tribes situated along the south-western border of Libya. 
Due to their extended tribal relationships on both sides of borders 
often facilitates illegal migration into Libyan territory.148 
Tebu GNA, Tuareg Nomadic tribes controls territories South of Kufra and Sebha. 
Similarly to Tuaregs, Tebu tribes facilitate migrant activity by 




GNA, Libyan militias The Eritrean Smuggling Group led by Ermias Ghermay is a 
“transnational network responsible for trafficking and smuggling 
tens of thousands of migrants, mainly from the Horn of Africa to 
the coast of Libya and onwards to destination countries in Europe 




Nigerian mafia Medium size smuggling groups that focuses on illegal migrants 
mostly from Nigerian ethnic group. Nigerian mafia directly benefit 
their smuggling activity. 
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low level of density correlates with a low average degree and clustering coefficient. This 
suggests a flexible network with high adaptability and resiliency. 
Table 3. Topography Measures of Smuggling Network 
Network Size Edges Diameter Avg Path Length 
Organizations 43 63 7 3.514 
     
Network Density 
Clustering 
Coefficient Avg Degree 
Degree 
Centralization 
Organizations 0.07 0.285 2.93 0.21 
     
 
While the UN-recognized GNA receives significant support from the European 
Union to control illegal migration activity along the Libyan shore, its military power relies 
heavily on militias and criminal groups that directly benefit from migrant smuggling.151 
On the other hand, the LNA’s core elements often target smuggling organizations to 
interdict their activity—for example, expelling the al-Dabbashi group from Sabratha—
however, their allied militias control remote regions in the Eastern and Southern parts of 
the country and manage migrant flow through Kufra, Tazirbu, Ghat, and Sabha.152  
To focus on the ties between smuggling groups, I extracted those subgroups that 
consist of the migrant smuggling organizations (Figure 19). By measuring the topography 
on these subgroups (Table 4), we observe a much higher density (0.115) and large network 
diameter (8). These metrics highlight the overarching nature of the smuggling network, 
where decentralized, often autonomously operating small- and medium-sized groups (like 
Nigerian and Somali smugglers) cover only one or two parts of the overall operation. Large 
and hierarchic international networks like the Eritrean smuggling group or the Nigerian 
mafia often operate larger migrant hubs and benefit the activity of smaller, locally 
operating criminal groups. These highly sophisticated transnational groups (like Eritrean 
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smuggling network) coordinate migrant flow along the entire region and have embedded 
cells in Italy and Western Europe. 
 
To focus on the ties between smuggling groups, I depicted those subgroups that consist of the 
migrant smuggling organizations. 
Figure 19. Migrant Smuggling Organizations 
Table 4. Smuggling Organizations, Network Measures 
 
The most recent study did not find evidence of any direct involvement of the Libyan 
government in migrant smuggling activity. Both the GNA and the LNA promote militias 
directly affect migration flow, however. This phenomenon is well illustrated by the triadic 
relations of the Eritrean smuggling group, the Abu-Qarin group, and the Al-Nasr brigade. 
While the Al-Nasr brigade fights under the GNA flag and controls detention centers and 
Libyan Coast Guard units around Zawiya, Mohammed Kachlaf (Al-Nasr brigade’s head) 
Network Size Edges Diameter Density Avg Path Length 
Subgroups 23 29 8 0.115 3.545 
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has a kinship tie to Abu-Qarin—an infamous smuggler highlighted on the UN Sanctions 
List. Additionally, he also cooperates with the transnational Eritrean smuggling group. The 
investigation of the Palermo Prosecutor’s Office of the Italian Anti-Mafia Directorate 
revealed that smuggling groups cooperate to promote the migrant flow along main routes. 
At the same time, there is a feud over control of the illegal migrant groups. This rivalry 
mostly remains under the level of open violence. Instead, it generates competition over the 
illegal migrants as objects and resources of the illegal activity. The better service and larger 
controlled territory result in an increasing number of illegal migrants for the respective 
smuggling group. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The SNA on the organization level reveals a decentralized, relatively sparse 
network. Small, autonomously operating organizations and centralized international 
criminal groups are connected by opportunistic ties that promote migrant smuggling 
activity in close cooperation with armed militias. The overall network spans the entire 
North African and Mediterranean region, with strong criminal groups or even mafia-type 
organizations in the target counties.  
Sparse and decentralized network structure indicates high adaptability and 
resiliency. The flexibility of the network can be a major factor of the fluid nature or the 
migratory flow that is indicated by the shifts between main migratory paths (Section B, 
Chapter II). As smuggling organizations operate in a highly uncertain environment, their 
structure tends to facilitate a higher flexibility and resiliency. We can see indicators of self-
organizing behavior and emergent patterns as a response to environmental effect. It is 
worth noting that smuggling organizations are operating in a resourceful environment. As 
a result, targeting a specific organization or a specific route might cause minimal impact 
on the overall flow as the network is able to restructure itself after a shock. A strategic 





VI. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE ERITREAN 
SMUGGLING NETWORK 
The SNA of the smuggling organizations (Chapter V) highlighted the prominent 
role of the Eritrean smuggling group in the Central Mediterranean. As such, this chapter 
uses SNA to analyze the social structure of this particular organization in order to identify 
structural vulnerabilities that might provide a better understanding of underlying dynamics 
of the endogenous network and its surrounding environment. 
While the observed criminal network is labeled as Eritrean Smuggling Group—
referring to the prominent ethnic group—the network facilitated migrant smuggling 
activity between the Horn of Africa and Northern Europe through Libya and Italy. The 
criminal organization collected migrants from several countries in the region, and it had 
Sudanese, Somali, Tunisian, Ethiopian, and Ghanaian members besides the leading ethnic 
group (Eritrean). This overarching criminal network controls every aspect of the smuggling 
activity from the country of origin to the destination country. Their affiliates are embedded 
into societies in donor countries and spread their narratives to the susceptible population. 
This thesis argues that the narrative of smuggling group (along with diaspora) inherently 
shapes the perception of societies in donor countries that plays a prominent role in the 
decision to migrate for millions of people (Chapter III). 
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The two main categories to destabilize illegal and covert networks are the kinetic 
and non-kinetic approach.153 As Admiral Eric T. Olson argues, while the kinetic approach 
“will always be required, its overall effects are not decisive. It may ‘buy time,’ but it is the 
non-kinetic approaches that ‘achieve the decisive results’ by shaping the environment and 
get long term effects.154 As migrant smuggling activity in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean region is frequently conducted by independently operating criminal groups 
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that cover only one or two phases of the whole operation, a kinetic approach will have a 
limited impact on the overall network. Moreover, kinetic targeting is often either too costly 
or unavailable due to the political and security environments. Therefore, this thesis will 
focus on non-kinetic strategies for disrupting or destabilizing these networks, while 
considering kinetic approaches only to the extent of their impact on the information space 
and cognitive dimension. For example, while key-leader targeting might have a limited 
impact on the overall activity due to its highly flexible and decentralized nature, higher 
detention rates within the European Union might generally impact the cost-benefit 
calculation of adversaries’ decision makers. 
Both kinetic and non-kinetic targeting can be applied at the individual, group, and 
organizational levels.155 Depending on the background information, the environment, the 
culture, and the available capabilities, analysts can focus on financial ties, communication 
ties, or operational ties by recommending a kinetic or non-kinetic approach or the 
combination of both.156 In 2011, Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton filled a theory gap by 
proposing a strategic framework for combating dark networks using both kinetic and non-
kinetic strategies. Included in the former are approaches that target individuals, groups, or 
organizations, or building the capacity of partner nations to do so.157 Included in the latter 
are strategies such as “institution-building, psychological operations (PSYOP), 
information operations (IO) and rehabilitation.”158  
B. DATA SOURCE 
The primary data source for this study was the N. 1874/2015 / DDA RG court file 
proposed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Palermo District, Italy.159 The court 
document describes the results of a large-scale investigation based on phone tapping, 
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surveillance operations, and testimonies of victims conducted by the Anti-Mafia 
Investigation Directorate (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia) between October 2013 and 
April 2015. The operation was launched after the tragic Lampedusa shipwreck in 2013 that 
claimed the lives of 366 migrants. The court document was obtained through the UNODC 
Case Law Database accessed by the Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime 
System (SHERLOC). The relational data was systematically extracted by manual content 
analysis, anonymized, and then stored in a database saved in a CSV file structured for 
analytical purposes. The observation period was between October 2013 and April 2015. 
An actor qualifies as a member of the smuggling group if he or she has an active 
role in smuggling operations under the direct or indirect control of a leader of the 
smuggling organization. Based on the court files, the analysis revealed three different 
layers of the social structure: financial, trust, and cooperation networks. The different 
subnetworks had been stacked into a single aggregated graph. Weighted edges apply only 
to the Italy-based subcluster while the whole network is depicted by single undirected ties. 
This is because the edge weights of the Italy-based subgroup are not comparable with 
relational data of the Libya-based clusters, due to the different intensity and frequency of 
surveillance. 
C. ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the Eritrean smuggling group is divided into three main parts and 
aims to analyze the aggregate structure and the underlying functions of the network. The 
first focuses on the whole network to explore the social structure, capacity, and 
vulnerabilities of the aggregated network. The second explores the Italy-based subcluster 
of the network to reveal underlying factors of this particular subgroup. As Italy-based 
smugglers were a subject of enhanced surveillance conducted by the Italian Anti-Mafia 
Investigation Directorate, detailed relational data provides a deeper picture of social 
structure and flow of resources within this subcluster. In the third part, the study applies 
exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to test those attributes that may lead to tie 
formation within the network. 
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1. Whole Network 
The extensive criminal investigation revealed a rather hierarchic, highly 
sophisticated transnational smuggling organization that managed a high-profile criminal 
activity managing the movement of tens of thousands of illegal migrants from the Horn of 
Africa to Western Europe. While the smuggling operations exploited migrants from 
Eritrea, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, the network had members in 
Israel, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The investigation resulted in 
the accusation of 24 convicts. Palermo Public Court found them all guilty on 10 April 2015 
and 23 culprits were detained. The 24th actor is still at large and active in North Africa. 
With the verdict in April 2015, the criminal court case of the largest known migrant 
smuggling organization in history was closed.  
a. Roles and Tasks 
The systematic analysis of the court document revealed four different roles within 
the network: organizers, intermediate leaders, executors, and facilitators. An organizer is 
an actor who gives orders to others but does not receive them. It is worth noting that 
“organizers” are somewhat independent, and they are coordinating horizontally with other 
“organizers,” while there is no single central actor within the network. This suggests some 
level of self-organizing behavior of the overall network. 
“Intermediate leaders” receive orders from “organizers” and control a smaller 
subgroup that is often operating within a discrete geographical location. 
“Executors” receive orders and fulfill tasks like collecting migrants, transportation, 
operating safe houses, or organizing logistical support. The fourth role is “facilitator.” 
Facilitators do not take part actively in smuggling operations, but they provide essential 
services like financial operations (like hawala method) or forging documents. 
I identified four tasks: “coordination,” “logistical,” “transportation,” and 
“collecting migrants.” The task “coordination” is tied to “organizers” and refers to a wide 
spectrum of tasks that aims to control resources within a particular subgroup under the 
direct control of “organizer” and coordinate its activity with other smuggling groups. 
“Logistical” tasks include complex operational profile like collecting money, withdrawing 
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migrants from detention camps, buying tickets, promoting official documents for asylum 
seekers, and organizing trips to Western European countries. The task is provided by 
“executors” The task “transportation” is also typically done by “executors” and refers to 
moving migrants within the area of operation. “Collecting migrants” is a critical task of the 
operation when the smuggling organization link up with illegal migrants upon their arrival 
in the detention camp. This task is also performed by “executors” and includes organizing 
the escape of illegal migrants from detention camps.  
b. Network Structure 
The stacked network consists of 129 nodes and 299 edges with the average distance 
of 2.76 (Table 5, Figure 20). Topography measures reveal low density score (0.036) and a 
high level of degree centralization (73%). The Conditional Uniform Graphs test (CUG) 
justifies the statistical significance of the high degree of centrality in the Eritrean network. 
CUG compares the density of the observed network to 1,000 randomly generated 
graphs.160 None of the random graphs produced the observed centralization; therefore, we 
can infer that it is a unique feature of the network structure that might not be formed by 
random chance. Network density is calculated as total number of ties divided by the total 
possible ties (every actor is connected to every other actor).161 A low density indicates a 
flexible and adaptable network, while it has a lower probability of quick employment of 
resources. Degree centralization measures the distribution of ties.162 In a highly centralized 
network, a few actors possess most of the ties and control the resources or information. 
Modularity compares the ties within and across subgroups to a randomly generated 
network with the same size and same number of ties. A higher modularity indicates higher 
clustering within the network that results in a larger number of ties within the subgroups 
and fewer ties between them. I use normalized modularity that indicates a more accurate 
measure regardless of the number of communities.  
 
160 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 102. 
161 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 97. 
162 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 93. 
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A modest level of normalized modularity (q-prime) (0.404) and low density (0.036) 
combined with a high degree of centralization and relatively short average path length 
(2.763) suggest a sparse and spread, rather hierarchical network structure, where 
“organizers” have quick access to information and resources in their local cluster but not 
necessarily across the entire network. We can assume that the whole network tends to 
achieve an optimal level of centralization and resilience where highly centralized local 
clusters allow quick mobilization, but the lower number of ties between subgroups provide 
a flexible structure for the whole network. 
Table 5. Eritrean Smuggling Group, Network Measures 
 
Uncertain environment and competition over resources could be major factors that 
led to higher centralization and a rather hierarchical structure in the network. For example, 
while Libyan smugglers tend to dominate areas and migratory routes, the boundaries on 
the Italian side are less rigid. As a common “modus operandi,” Libyan smugglers launch 
boats from the Libyan shore to Sicily or Lampedusa. Interestingly, Libyan smugglers 
usually release direct control over the vessels as they leave the North African shores. 
Although Libyan smugglers inform their Italian counterparts about the time of arrival and 
the number of vessels, different smuggling groups compete over collecting illegal migrants 
on the Italian side. In other words, the faster and more sophisticated a smuggling group, 
the larger its share of the market. 










Subgroups correlate with geographical location: Green and gray subgroups are located in North 
Africa, while communities in purple and blue are active in Italy. 
Figure 20. Whole Network, Colored by Subgroups 
Despite the high centralization, the social structure is not composed of a single 
hierarchy; rather, it suggests horizontally coordinating local hierarchies.163 As dark 
networks tend to converge to an optimal level of density and centralization, in this case, 
the system might mitigate the vulnerability of high centralization by independently 
operating decentralized groups linked together by flexible and opportunistic ties. For 
instance, Actor #14 is the top-level leader of the Italian subgroup, who horizontally 
cooperates with Libyan leaders like Actors #30, #31, and #49, while he directly controls 
criminal cells in Italy.  
The court case indicates that Italian and Libyan organizers coordinate—sometimes 
even personally—the strategic aspects of the smuggling operations, while the daily 
 
163 Paolo Campana, “Out of Africa: The Organization of Migrant Smuggling across the 




activities are coordinated by lower-level executors. This observation supports the 
assumption that the organizers are operating rather independently, while their subgroups 
tend to be more centralized and interconnected. It is worth noting that there is no single 
authority who controls the network rather self-organized horizontal groups that produces 
emergent patterns. This feature can be a major factor of the resilience of the overall 
network, as local organizers are able to supervise their subordinates and enforce norms, 
although disabling one or more subgroups has little effect on the overall flow. 
2. Italy-Based Subgroup 
For further analysis, I extracted the subgroup operating in Italy. Subgroups are 
communities within the network that have more ties within the group than with other 
groups comparing to a random graph.164 I apply Girvan-Neuman community detection 
algorithm to identify subgroups within the Eritrean network.165 As this subgroup had been 
exposed to enhanced surveillance, I could calculate edge weights in case of cooperation 
and financial ties based on frequency of the contacts or sum of the money transferred 
(Section F, Appendix C). Weighted ties and extended attribute data facilitate a more 
accurate understanding of the network structure and flow of resources and non-material 
goods. 
The extracted network has 39 nodes and 146 edges with a much higher density 
(0.196 vs. 0.036) but similar centralization level (0.73 vs. 0.78) compared to the whole 
network (Table 6). Figure 21 highlights that while the subnetwork gravitates toward 
Sicily—as disembarkation is one of the most critical part of the illegal operation—the 
smuggling group spans the whole country. The subcluster consists of three different roles 
within the network that highly correlate with the hierarchical structure: organizers, 
intermediate leaders, and executors. The only organizer in this group is Actor #14, who is 
by far the most central node of the network with the degree centrality score of 67, while 
the second most central node has the score of 20. Actors #5, #41, #13, and #27 fulfill 
 
164 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 109. 
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intermediate leadership roles. The area of operations of intermediate leaders often 
described by a specific spatial location (see the Lombardy cell with actors #26, #40, and 
#41). Based on the court document, Actor #13 is second in leadership, which correlates 
with the observation that he has the highest degree centrality score (18) between 
intermediate leaders and that he is the third most central node in the extracted network. 
“Executors” typically fulfill tasks like “collecting migrants,” “transportation,” or fulfilling 
“logistical” tasks. As logisticians provide complex operations, actors with this task have 
typically higher prestige within the network. The centrality scores and network attributes 
reveal a flat hierarchy that results in a large leadership span for organizers. This observation 
will be further analyzed as a vulnerability in the Summary. 
 
Figure 21. Italy-Based Subgroup Colored by Spatial Location 
 
76 
Table 6. Italy-Based Subgroup, Network Measures 
 
a. Impacts of Disrupting Italy-Based Network 
The descriptive statistics of IBCs suggests that targeting even a prominent subgroup 
might have little effect on the overall flow of illegal migrants in a specified region. Figure 
22 depicts the number of IBCs in the Central Mediterranean region between 2013 and 
2017.166 
 
Figure 22. IBCs in Central Mediterranean Between 2013 and 2017167 
 
166 European Commission, “Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings; Monthly Statistics,” 9 October 
2019, https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/dataset/ds00032_en. 
167 Adapted from Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics.“ 




subgroup 39 146 4 0.197 1.93 0.73 0.298 
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The line chart shows the total number of detected border crossings, while the 
stacked bar chart indicates nationalities influenced by the Eritrean smuggling group. IBCs 
in the Central Mediterranean region show an annual cyclic pattern with a maximum around 
late summer-early fall, and a minimum around January. As smuggling organizations 
usually exploit migrants from the same nationality, Eritreans are the most prominent ethnic 
groups between the highlighted nationalities.168 The number of IBCs committed by 
highlighted nationalities decreased over time after disrupting the Italy-based subgroup 
(date of verdict is 10 April 2015), but the total number of border crossings slightly 
increased in 2016 and one year later reached the 2015 level. 
3. Explaining Tie Formation—Exponential Random Graph Models 
Revealing tendencies of tie formation based on internal and external factors within 
the network can provide useful insight of network dynamics and serve as a starting point 
for planning strategies to influence dark networks. I apply ERGMs to predict underlying 
factors of tie formation within the Italy-based subnetwork. ERGM is a statistical model 
designed to predict dynamics within the network based on the network’s micro-
configurations (local patterns of ties) and a set of attributes.169 ERGMs generate thousands 
of random simulated networks that predict what a network of the same size would look 
like, given the micro-configurations and attributes included in the model.170 When we find 
a model where the simulations do not differ significantly (in a statistical sense) from the 
actual network, we can conclude that we have identified the key micro-configurations and 
attributes that drive the overall structure of the network. In my analysis of the Italy-based 
subcluster, I include “spatial location,” “role,” and “task” as possible predictors of forming 
a new tie between Italy-base smugglers (Figure 23, Table 7). 
 
168 Europol and Interpol, “Migrant Smuggling Networks: Executive Summary” (European Union, 
May 2016), 7, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/europol-interpol-report-migrant-
smuggling-networks. 
169 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 247. 
170 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 250. 
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Figure 23. Italy-Based Subcluster Colored by Attributes 
Table 7. Output of Models 
*** Statistical significance at the 0.0001 probability level. 
** Statistical significance at the 0.001 probability level. 
* Statistical significance at the 0.05 probability level
The first step was to determine those micro-configurations that might be consistent 
with tie formation based on what we know about the network. I included edge and 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Edges 10.31 -3.22 *** -3.96 *** -3.60 ***
Gwesp (Alt K-Stars) 1.68 *** 1.67 *** 1.80 *** 1.71 *** 
Location: 
Sicily -0.13 -0.23
Shared Location -0.14 -0.19
Task: 
Coordination -12.81 0.69 * 0.64 *
Shared Task -0.11 -0.16
Role: 
Intermediate leader -1.52 *** -1.52 *** -1.41 ***
Shared Role -13.57 0.38 
AIC 750.20 746.40 763.60 748.00 
BIC 789.00 770.60 787.90 767.50 
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alternating k-stars as endogenous factors (Figure 24). The former controls for the number 
of ties in the network, while the latter captures popularity or preferential attachments.171 
 
Figure 24. Alternating k-star172 
When just focusing on micro-configurations, together these provide the best fit. 
Following that, I included (exogenous) factors like “role,” “task,” and “spatial location” to 
determine which factor and to what extent explains the network’s observed structure. As 
no shared attributes were statistically significant, I built working hypotheses for individual 
attributes. Several iterations indicated the importance of the task of “coordination” and role 
of “intermediate leaders.” In Model 4, I tested how “coordination” as a task and 
“intermediate leader” as a role impact tie formation. According to low AIC, BIC scores 
and high goodness of fit value, this model is a good representation of the observed network. 
It suggests that two actors with the task of “coordination” have almost two times higher 
probability (EXP 0.63 = 1.88) to form a new tie if every other factor remain the same. On 
the other hand, two intermediate leaders have negative probability to form a new tie. This 
suggests that tie formation would support the hierarchical aspects of the network, where 
intermediate leaders forming new ties with executors or organizers (top-level leaders) but 
the horizontal coordination has a low probability. 
 
171 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 259. 




Based on the finding of the SNA, the research then considers resilience and 
vulnerabilities of the whole network. The resilience of the network could be discussed 
through a simple observation: while several prominent leaders were detained in 2015 (date 
of verdict is 10th of April), disrupting the Italian part of the network, the total number of 
IBCs slightly increased in 2016 and stagnated in 2017 in the same area of operation.  
To explain the resilience of the whole network, we can consider three perspectives: 
(1) removal of the central nodes had little effect on the overall migrant flow, (2) The whole 
network has the capacity and flexibility to recover quickly, (3) the network is operating 
within a resourceful environment. At first, while a major part of the network had been 
disrupted by capturing 22 prominent members in Italy, smaller smuggling groups—out of 
the scope of this study— most likely filled the power vacuum and divided up the smuggling 
market in Sicily. Second, as the Libya-based clusters were almost intact (only two of the 
24 convicts were operating in Libya), the network retained the capacity to recover its 
structure by forming new ties and bridging structural holes. Horizontally cooperating 
individualistic groups can restructure the network relatively quickly after a major shock. 
While the scope of the study is focusing on actors who are functioning within the 
determined network boundaries, the observed smuggling network is embedded into a larger 
system where several smuggling groups are covering the same stage of the migratory route. 
While a Libyan organizer usually keeps contact with several smuggling groups in Italy, 
Italy-based groups are receiving migrants from multiple organizers in Libya. Although all 
groups tend to occupy monopolistic positions, more often multiple smuggling groups are 
operating in the same space and providing a plurality of ‘service’ for illegal migrants. 
Finally, smuggling networks are operating in a resourceful environment. While the ratio of 
the highlighted nationalities steadily decreased after disrupting the Italian subgroup, illegal 
migrants from West and Central African countries increased in numbers in the same period. 
Consequently, the overall number of IBCs in the Central Mediterranean region stagnated 
after disrupting the Italy-based network. For instance, in October 2014, 1,076 illegal 
Nigerian nationals reached the Italian shores, while two years later this number was 
increased to 6,638 in the same quarter, respectively. This growth was affected by two major 
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factors: (1) While the Italian-subgroup was disrupted in 2015, the Libyan network was 
fully operational in the same period. Concurrently, widespread violence followed by the 
rising military power of Boko Haram caused 650,000 internally displaced people in Nigeria 
and 80,000 refugees in 2014.173 The increased number of Nigerian migrants compensated 
the temporarily decreased flow from Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia. Also, (2) Tuareg and 
Tebu tribes were able to restore the war-torn smuggling routes across the southeastern 
border of Libya in the same period.174 As a result, the overall output of the system 
remained at the same level.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Eritrean smuggling group facilitated migrant smuggling activity between the 
Horn of Africa and Northern Europe through Libya and Italy. It controlled large-scale 
movement of illegal migrants from several countries in the region, like Eritrean Sudan, 
Somalia, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Ghana. This overarching criminal network controlled 
every aspect of the smuggling activity from the country of origin through to the destination 
country. Their affiliates are embedded into societies in donor countries and spread their 
narratives to the susceptible population. While a prominent smuggling network was 
disrupted in 2015, interestingly, the total number of IBCs slightly increased in 2016 and 
stagnated in 2017 in the same area of operation. 
Also, I found evidence that the ‘modus operandi’ of smuggling groups is based on 
influencing the susceptible population. As several opportunistic groups provide the same 
illegal service for migrants, they are competing over the control of resources and migrant 
flow. The share of the market is based on the reputation and the capabilities of the 
smuggling group, respectively. The better the service and the stronger the narrative of one 
particular group, the larger its share of the market. Therefore, smugglers are interested in 
spreading their own narrative and keep up their good reputation. For example, 
“logisticians” in the Italy-based subgroup commanded to keep migrants well and this norm 
 
173 Human Rights Watch, “Rights Trends in World Report 2015: Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch, 12 
January 2015, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/nigeria. 
174 Shaw and Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition, 13; and Pack, “Kingdom of Militias: 
Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession,” 3. 
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was strictly enforced by Actor #14, the top-level leader. This rule aims to spread the 
reputation of the criminal group and shape the perception of the migrant population. The 
reputation, the contact info, and the offered service spread through social ties. Lower-level 
smugglers are embedded into the societies of donor countries and spread their narratives 
directly to the susceptible population. These narratives aim to shape the perception of 
migrants and influence their behavior to migrate.  
Moreover, smuggling groups are operating in a resourceful environment, where 
targeting one specific group—even if it is a large and highly sophisticated smuggling 
group—has little effect on overall flow. It is worth noting that there is no single authority 
who controls the whole smuggling network; rather, we can infer self-organizing behavior 
that gives rise to emergent patterns. In the case of disrupting one or two subnetworks, the 
system will rapidly recover due to its self-organization and adaptation. Long-term effects 
require the suppression of the whole smuggling network and/or affecting the environmental 
(exogenous) factors. This observation drives our attention to the systemic behavior of the 
migratory system and confirms our hypothesis that a systems approach is required to 




VII. SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Previous chapters highlighted the self-organizing and emergent patterns of migrant 
smuggling networks and the systemic behavior of the illegal migration system in the 
Central Mediterranean. These findings drive our analysis toward the systemic planning 
process that is outlined in this chapter. The aim of the planning process is to inform decision 
makers of the causal feedback loops, time delays, self-organizing, and limitations that 
characterize the behavior of the migratory system. This chapter develops three strategic 
approaches and recommends the one with the higher probability to succeed.  
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The following part consider the theoretical background that serves as a fundamental 
basis for systemic analysis. 
1. Systems Approach 
Russel L. Ackoff in 1981 defined a system as a set of elements that satisfy the 
following conditions: “(1) The behavior of each element has an effect on the behavior of 
the whole; (2) The behavior of the elements and their effects on the whole are 
interdependent; (3) However subgroups of the elements are formed, each has an effect on 
the behavior of the whole and none has an independent effect.”175 
2. Understanding a System 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy argues that understanding a system requires not only an 
understanding of the parts but the relationship between them.176 One of the fundamental 
notions of system theory is that any system when reduced to its parts would lose its 
functionality and some of its essential properties.177 Consequently, analysis without 
synthesis will lose sight of some of the inherent fundamental properties of the observed 
 
175 Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future, 15. 
176 Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, “The History and Status of General Systems Theory,” Academy of 
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phenomena, just as the age of Enlightenment was very much focused on reductionism for 
analysis. Ackoff argues that synthesis and expansionism are inherent characteristics of 
systems thinking. He defines a systems approach as a sequence in which synthesis precedes 
analysis: 
1. Identify a containing whole (system) of which the thing to be explained 
is a part. 
2. Explain the behavior or properties of the containing whole. 
3. Then explain the behavior or properties of the thing to be explained in 
terms of its role(s) or function(s) within its containing whole.178 
Bertalanffy highlights that perception is only an imperfect reflection of reality, and 
human understanding is inherently dependent upon the perspective of the observer.179 
Ackoff illustrated the same phenomena with the analogy of an orange: when an orange is 
sliced vertically, it appears very different than when it is sliced cross sectionally, although 
both views reveal the same object. Based on these notions and the findings of quantum 
physics, Hester and Adams claimed that a perfect understanding of a complex systemic 
problem requires an infinite number of perspectives.180 Consequently, while we may never 
have perfect understanding of a complex systemic problem, the more perspective gained, 
and the more time provided, the better our understanding. While analysis provides a deeper 
understanding of different parts of the system and reveals different aspects of the same 
strategic problem, the synthesis and the systems approach are tools that reveal essential 
properties and behavior of the system as a whole. 
3. Complexity Science 
Jackson and Keys differentiate simple and complex systems. “A simple system will 
be perceived to consist of a small number of elements, and the interactions between these 
elements will be few, or at least regular. A complex system will, on the other hand, be seen 
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as being composed of a large number of elements, and these will be highly interrelated.”181 
V. Rao Vemuri identifies four characteristics of complex systems: (1) Some of its parts are 
not directly observable. (2) Quantitative approach gives probable effects rather than exact 
effects. (3) Complex systems are rather open than closed and evolve over time due to the 
interactions with its environment; and (4) system behavior is often affected by political, 
cultural, ethical, etc., factors.182  
According to Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, a closed system transfers 
energy or resources across its elements but does not interact (or transfer matter) with the 
surrounding environment, while an open system facilitates transfer of materials or energy 
across system boundaries. Consequently, an open system cannot be understood without an 
understanding of the containing whole (i.e., Ackoff’s expansionism).183 
As Ralph D. Stacey describes the science of complexity as being “concerned with 
the dynamical properties of nonlinear and network feedback systems.”184 These non-linear 
feedback systems are characterized by two characteristics: (1) bounded instability and (2) 
spontaneous self-organization and emergent order. System dynamics is one tool that may 
be used to understand the underlying dynamics of problematic behavior in a complex 
system by bounding and modeling the endogenous structure of the system that is resulting 
in the problematic outcome. This behavior is determined by non-linear feedback processes 
within the system. All dynamics are related to only two types of feedback loops: positive 
(reinforcing) and negative (balancing) loops.185 The concept of bounded instability is 
based on the notion that non-linear feedback systems are tied to deterministic rules; 
therefore, the short-term behavior of the system is predictable. Systems operating at the 
edge of instability (disequilibriated state), however, give rise to emergent self-organizing 
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behavior and emergent order that generates unpredictable patterns in the long term. 
Bounded instability is a state that is paradoxically is both stable and unstable where patterns 
are identifiable in the past, but they are not predictable over the long run.186 Consequently, 
a complex systemic problem is difficult to understand due to the partially observable parts 
that are constantly interacting with each other as well as with the environment, generating 
non-linear and probabilistic behavior. Also, feedback mechanisms, which are characterized 
by time delays and non-linearity, make it difficult to construct a reliable mental model even 
in the most simplistic feedback network. In the context of strategic planning, mental models 
provide the cognitive map that bridges the gap between the current state and the desired end 
state. As the starting point, the end state, and the network of feedback loops are subject to 
imperfect interpretation and often incomplete information, however, our cognitive maps, or 
mental models, are imperfect representations of the complex system in which a problem 
lies. 
4. Complex Adaptive Systems 
The study of CAS is a derivative of complexity science, which was founded in the 
late 1980s. One of the most prominent contributors was John Henry Holland, who had a 
particular interest in genetic evolution as an inherent characteristic of CAS. Based on 
Holland’s observations, Jason Brownlee highlighted three characteristics of CAS to 
explain what makes them difficult to analyze: “(1) The systems lose the majority of their 
features when the parts are isolated. (2) The systems are highly dependent on their history 
making it difficult [..] to derive trends. (3) They operate far from global optimum and points 
of equilibrium making them hard to assess with conventional approaches.”187 Brownlee 
defined CAS as “composed of populations of adaptive agents whose interactions result in 
complex non-linear dynamics.”188 Simon A. Levin defines CAS by three properties: 
1. diversity and individuality of components, 
2. localized interactions among those components, and 
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3. an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions to select 
a subset of those components for replication or enhancement.189 
Adaptation can occur at the individual, local, and system levels, but the different 
levels are highly interrelated. Adaptation at the individual level can lead to competition 
between actors and local adaptation. Actors in a CAS model anticipate the future and they 
take current actions based on their cost-benefit calculus and the expected outcomes that 
produce competitive advantage in the anticipated future. A CAS is characterized by the 
“ability to change its rules in response to environmental change.”190 Brownlee highlights 
two important aspects of CAS: emergence and self-organization. Holland argues that 
adaptation and self-organization lead to complexity, as local rules give rise to emergent 
order that eventually impacts global behavior of the system.191 Self-organization is the 
capacity of the system to make its own structure more complex by generating 
heterogeneity.192 Self-organization is driven by local interactions and provoked by 
instability.193 Due to the utter complexity, actors cannot predict their long-term future, but 
the outcomes emerge from interactions between agents in a probabilistic manner.194  
Applying this to the migration network in the Central Mediterranean, we can argue 
that the current strategic environment is characterized by global interconnectivity of 
political, socio-economic, and security factors influenced by an overarching information 
domain. The more we recognize and acknowledge the uncertainty and non-deterministic 
nature of the strategic environment, the higher the probability to successfully plan to 
address strategic problems. 
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B. THE MIGRATION SYSTEM 
A complex systemic problem is a “detectable gap between a present state and a 
desired state,” where interaction between parts determines non-linear system behavior and 
probabilistic outcomes.195 Illegal mass migration in the Central Mediterranean can be 
characterized as a systemic problem where interconnectedness between the parts is 
characterized by complex adaptive behavior that causes unpredictable outcomes. System 
dynamics are driven by the structure of the system and the non-linear feedback 
mechanisms. While there is a cause-and-effect relationship between connected parts of the 
system, the complexity of the feedback mechanism—and the significant time delay in some 
cases—generates unpredictable (often chaotic) outcomes.  
Our cognitive maps of a causal structure are usually oversimplified models of a 
complex systemic problem, and mental models tend to neglect the effect of a complex 
feedback mechanism. These constrained mental models are consequences of our cognitive 
limitations like memory recall, attention, information processing capacity, and misapplied 
heuristics that might ultimately lead to poor decision making.196 Non-linearities, where 
cause and effect are often separated over time and space, exceed our cognitive ability to 
predict outcomes. For instance, while we can see a strong positive correlation between 
smuggling activity and the number of illegal migrants, the smuggling network is also 
influenced by several other factors, such as bilateral agreements between EU and transit 
countries, the level of border protection, and NGOs’ activity. The overall effect of feedback 
within the migration network generates complex non-linear outcomes within the 
subsystems (e.g., the smuggling network) and gives rise to unpredictable, probabilistic 
system behavior. We can see clear indications of the probabilistic nature of the drivers of 
illegal migration. For example, while we have statistical evidence of the correlations 
between IBCs and armed conflicts, political terror, or expanding diaspora, none of these 
factors alone necessarily trigger illegal migration. Rather, an increase in any of these 
factors could increase the rate of illegal migration. Similarly, while GDP per capita is often 
 
195 Hester and Adams, Systemic Thinking, 29. 
196 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston, 
MA: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 27. 
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cited as a key factor of illegal migration (and migration generally), the statistical analysis 
found a rather non-linear goal-seeking behavior between GDP per capita and IBCs. 
A causal loop diagram is used to identify those feedback loops that might contribute 
to the observed system dynamics. The diagram represents only a causal relationship 
between variables and excludes correlations as they represent only past behavior and not 
the structure of the system.197 Polarity notation is assigned to each link such that a positive 
notation represents a reinforcing (i.e., same) causal relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables, and a negative notation represents a balancing (i.e., opposite) 
causal relationship (Figure 25).198 Theoretically, the output of the smuggling loop would 
grow exponentially if every other variable remained constant. On the other hand, a 
feedback loop can be negative or balancing if the loop has an odd number of negative links. 
For example, smuggling activity increases security threats within the EU, which then lead 
to enhanced border protection and legal countermeasures that ultimately decrease 
smuggling activity.  
C. BOUNDARIES  
System boundaries are essential elements of sense making, representing the “area 
within which the decision-taking process of the system has power to make things happen, 
or to prevent them from happening.”199 Boundaries are arbitrary constructions made by 
the observer who intends to address a systemic problem, although the interaction between 
an open system and its environment is subject to continuous transfer of resources, energy, 
or non-material goods.200 System boundaries are not geospatial constructions; rather, they 
bound system elements and variables. These boundaries are sometimes tied to spatial 
constraints, however. On the other hand, the environment of the system is defined as “a set 
 
197 Sterman, 141. 
198 Sterman, 137–56. 
199 Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice: Includes a 30-Year Retrospective (New 
York, NY: Wiley, 1999), 312. 
200 Hester and Adams, Systemic Thinking, 165. 
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of elements and their relevant properties, which elements are not part of the system, but a 
change in any of which can cause or produce a change in the state of the system.”201  
As we consider the illegal migration system as an open, complex adaptive system, 
its behavior is not understandable without recognition of the interaction between the parts 
and their containing environment. The political and socio-economic dynamics of origin 
and target countries, the economically and politically motivated influence of EU decision 
making, the activity of violent extremist organization, and the cooperation between the EU 
and donor/transit countries are all part of the containing environment. On the other hand, 
IBCs, smuggling networks, NGO activity, border protection, and diaspora within the EU 
are all parts of the endogenous system (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25. Migration System, Causal Loop Diagram 
 
201 Russell L. Ackoff, Fred E. Emery, and Brent D. Ruben, On Purposeful Systems: An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Individual and Social Behavior as a System of Purposeful Events (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Routledge, 2006), 19. 
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We can see clear indications of self-organization at both local and system levels. 
For instance, the behavior of the smuggling system is a result of the system’s structure as 
well as the smugglers’ adaptation to changes in their surrounding environment. 
D. STRATEGIES 
To develop strategies for addressing the strategic problem, the eight-step planning 
process proposed by John M. Bryson is used.202 The planning process shall consider the 
following strategic questions: 
• Can enhanced border control significantly reduce the security threats 
related to illegal migration? 
• How can a large bureaucratic system face a CAS that is operating without 
higher control or authority? 
• What are the underlying drivers of illegal mass migration? 
1. Agreement Upon a Strategic Planning Effort 
The initial step of the planning process is an agreement upon the “purpose of the 
effort; preferred steps in the process; [and] the form and timing of reports.”203 Moreover, 
it should cover the members and their responsibilities of the executive committee and the 
planning team.204 NATO appears to be at the appropriate strategic level to address the 
security threats of illegal migration. The proposed executive committee and the 
adjudicative authority, the stakeholders, the planning team, and subject matter experts are 
identified in Table 8. Strategic approaches (Course of Actions - CoAs) developed by the 
planners should be presented to the adjudicative authority at the end of an eight-month 
planning period. An initial progress report is presented to the executive committee after the 
end of the third week. Periodic progress reports to the executive committee are planned bi-
 
202 John M. Bryson, “A Strategic Planning Process for Public and Non-Profit Organizations,” Long 
Range Planning 21, no. 1 (February 1988): 74, https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-6301(88)90061-1. 




monthly. The final review will be presented after seven months and chaired by the SHAPE 
Director of Development and Preparation. The planning process is based on analytics and 
system dynamics modeling. The execution phase varies between two and 15 years 
depending on the strategic approach selected. The effectiveness of the selected strategy is 
analyzed by net assessment conducted by SMEs and designated elements of the planning 
team. The result of the net assessment is shared with the executive committee. If it is 
necessary, the executive committee recommends strategy adjustment to the adjudicative 
authority. 
Table 8. Participants of the Planning Process 
Adjudicative Authority 
General Tod D. Wolters Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
Stakeholders 
Supreme Allied Command Europe 
The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
UN World Health Organization 
UN International Organization for Migration 
EUROPOL 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency—FRONTEX 







ADM Joachim Rühle SHAPE Chief of Staff 
VADM Hervé Bléjean Director General of the European Union Military Staff 
MG Piotr A. Blazeusz, Ph.D. SHAPE Director of Strategic Development and Preparation 
LTG Eric P. Wendt  Commander NSHQ 
RADM Bülent Turan SHAPE Director of Partnership 
MG Phillip A. Stewart SHAPE Director of Strategic Employment 
BG Davide Re NATO Strategic Direction‒South HUB Director 
Mr. Andres B. Munoz Mosquera SHAPE Office of Legal Affairs 
 
Planning Team 
3 Officers (O6, O5) SHAPE Strategic Development and Preparation Directorate, J3, J5 
2 Officers (O6, O5) EU Military Staff 
2 Officers (O6, O5) SHAPE Partnership Directorate, J9, County Engage 
1 Officer (O5) SHAPE Strategic Employment Directorate, J2 
1 Officer (O5) SHAPE Office of Special Operations 
1 Officer (O5) NATO Special Operations headquarters 
2 Officers (O6, O5) NATO Strategic Direction‒South HUB 
2 Officers EUROPOL 





Subject Matter Experts 
Dr. Wayne N. Porter Naval Postgraduate School, System Science (System Dynamics Modeling) 
Dr. Sean Everton Naval Postgraduate School, Social Science (Dark Network, Religion, Social Contagion and Influence) 
Dr. Paolo Campagna University of Cambridge, Criminology and Complex Networks 
Representative Migration Policy Institute 
 
2. Identification and Clarification of Mandates 
Strategic planning seeks to decrease the security threat imposed by illegal mass 
migration. Every counter measure must be in accordance with the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.205 Military 
kinetic actions are out of the scope of this planning process. Kinetic effects are available 
only through interagency and law enforcement cooperation with partner nations or member 
countries. Non-kinetic actions have to be aligned with NATO strategic guidance with 
special attention to North Atlantic Council-approved target audiences. Capability/capacity 
building, strategic communication, and non-kinetic targeting of foreign target audiences is 
to be worked through close diplomatic cooperation with the host nations.  
3. Development and Clarification of Mission and Values 
The aim of the NATO mission is to control illegal migration in order to address its 
related security threats and decrease the probability of humanitarian crisis within member 
and partner countries. Stakeholders are kept informed by the planning team/executive 
committee in accordance with their interest and authority to address the problem and 
mitigate security threats (Figure 26). The core values that underlie the mission include the 
provision of security to the citizens of member countries while ensuring the human rights 
of all populations affected by illegal migration. The end state is a contained level of illegal 
 
205 United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, accessed 16 April 
2021, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights; and European Commission, 




migration while ensuring the humanitarian rights and safe and legal arrival of those persons 
who are eligible for refugee or legal resident status within the territory of the EU. 
 
Figure 26. Stakeholder Analysis206 
4. External Environmental Assessment 
This step considers the threats and opportunities outside of the organization of 
NATO. The immediate threat to NATO member countries is the infiltration of terrorist 
groups and radicalization of the Islamic population. Also, the increased level of migrant 
flow might lead to humanitarian crises along main migratory routes. As a long-term effect, 
illegal migration might lead to parallel societies and increased crime rates, which could 
decrease the resilience of NATO member countries.207 On the other hand, the Alliance has 
 
206 Adapted from “Stakeholder Matrix - Key Matrices for Stakeholder Analysis,” Stakeholdermap, 
accessed 17 March 2021, https://www.stakeholdermap.com/stakeholder-matrix.html. 




the opportunity to promote NATO–EU cooperation that might contribute to an enhanced 
control of illegal migration through a unified political and security approach. 
5. Internal Environmental Assessment 
The following steps assesses internal strengths and weaknesses of the bounded 
system. Steps 4 and 5 together provide the strength, weakness, opportunity, threat analysis, 
which will serve as a basis for strategy development. Strategic options aim to take 
advantage of strengths and opportunities while mitigating weakness and threats. The 
strength of the organization is the unified political mandate. Also, NATO countries 
together represent the largest military capabilities and resources in the world harnessed to 
cutting-edge technology. As a weakness, the alliance is a large bureaucratic organization 
that is facing highly adaptable and resilient self-organizing networks. 
6. Strategic Issue Identification 
Emergent patterns of social interactions, the bounded rationality associated with 
human (cognitive) systems, and the fluid nature of migrant smuggling organizations 
require rapid and flexible decision making. NATO is fundamentally driven by formalized 
political and strategic-level decisions requiring unanimous consent that is generally time 
consuming and inherently rigid. 
Illegal mass migration has created a severe humanitarian crisis along the main 
migration routes in the Central Mediterranean, but it has also provided channels for violent 
extremist organizations to infiltrate and operate within NATO territory and to exploit 
inherent vulnerability points within EU and NATO countries. 
7. Strategy Development 
As we can see in Figure 25, the endogenous system—as bounded for this strategic 
planning effort—is the interrelated network of smuggling, illegal migration, and counter 
measures feedback loops and their related variables. Yet, the number of emigrant/displaced 
people, the bilateral agreements, and the perception of migration—either positive or 
negative—are parts of the exogenous system (environment). A change in any endogenous 
variable leads directly or indirectly to a change in every other endogenous variable. On the 
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other hand, change in endogenous system variables does not lead directly to a change of 
any of the exogenous variables. 
Different strategic approaches focus on different parts of the system and exploit 
different leverage points. The aim of all three strategic approaches is to decrease the level 
of illegal migrations while mitigating related security threats. The end state is to contain 
the illegal migration at or below the 2010 level while both its short- and long-term effects 
are mitigated. 
a. Strategic Approaches—Overview 
(1) Strategic Approach 1 ‒ Capability Building 
• Political and institutional capability building 
• Military and law enforcement capability building 
• Socio-economic development 
• Infrastructural development 
(2) Strategic Approach 2 ‒ Counter Measures/Restrictive Policies 
• Enhanced border protection 
• Bilateral cooperation with donor and transit countries 
• Enhanced law enforcement operations against smuggling groups  
(3) Strategic Approach 3 ‒ Network Approach  
• Alter the multiple reinforcing feedback loop between migrant smugglers, 
diaspora, and migrant population. 
• Mitigate the social contagion and perceptional biases. 
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b. Strategic Approaches in Detail 
(1) Strategic Approach 1 
This strategic approach seeks changes in exogenous variables (environmental 
factors) to achieve behavioral change at the system level. The strategy is based on the 
concept of the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative launched in 
September 2014 by the NATO Wales Summit. The scope of this strategy includes key 
donor and transit countries like Algeria, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Eritrea, Somalia, Syria, and 
Tunisia. Allied countries and partner nations would provide training and advisory support 
for military and law enforcement elements along with political, institutional, and economic 
capability development packages. The strategy aims to increase the security and HDI in 
recipient countries to decrease the level of displacement and economic migration, and 
consequently to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling networks.  
By focusing on root causes of illegal migration, the strategy has a higher probability 
to alter the dominant feedback loops (Figure 27). Environmental change can provide 
enduring effects and trigger structural change of an endogenous system’s dynamics. 
According to Meadows, altering the system’s structure might have an enormous effect, but 
it could be very costly and time consuming.208 This strategy requires significant resources 
and a very complex effort. 
As the strategy offers a long-term solution, it is the most time consuming in the 
implementation phase. The time horizon of the implementation is 10–15 years. The 
effectiveness of the strategy can be measured by the increase in security and economic 
capabilities of recipient countries, and the decrease in the migrant population. The 
effectiveness of the strategy is measured by surveys, increased economic performance, and 
decreased criminal rate. 
 




Figure 27. Strategic Approach 1, Focus Areas 
 
(2) Strategic Approach 2 
This strategy aims to alter the cost-benefit calculus of illegal migration by 
decreasing the probability of successful migrant smuggling operation (Figure 28). The 
concept is built on an enhanced border protection level and bilateral cooperation with key 
transit countries like Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Coordinated large-scale law 
enforcement operations against migrant smuggling groups is also an integrated element of 
the strategy. 
The key advantage is the direct effect on the security threats; moreover, the result 
can be assessed in a relatively short time. The strategy is not dependent on the cooperation 
with a third country, and it is less exposed to perceptional factors. On the other hand, it 
might trigger emergent and self-organizing behavior within the smuggling network. 
As the systemic effects of the strategy would be more immediately apparent, this 
strategic approach has the shortest time horizon of 1–3 years. The effectiveness of the 
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strategy can be measured by the number of arrivals shortly after the strategy is put into 
effect. The methods of assessment could include statistical analysis and system dynamics 
modeling. 
 
Figure 28. Strategic Approach 2, Focus Areas 
(3) Strategic Approach 3 
The third strategic approach focuses on the societies in the countries of origin. 
While similar to the first strategy in that it is based on solving the problem by addressing 
the root cause, the third strategic approach is directed at the cognitive factor, or perceptions 
of illegal migration in the exogenous environment (Figure 29). This strategy also requires 
conflict resolution and capability-building efforts, but it is more focused on the changing 
the perceptions of potential migrants themselves. The concept is based on the notion that 
the overwhelming majority of illegal migrants has little or no relevant knowledge of the 
European country of destination. Rather, their perception is influenced by their social 
relationship and the media within their society of origin. This extends to their relatives and 
friends living in NATO or EU countries. Smuggling groups also play a key role in shaping 
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the cognitive space of the susceptible population as they advertise their service by 
promoting unrealistic promises. The lack of a unified EU migration policy further enables 
the messaging of smugglers and accelerates social contagion. Shockingly, hundreds of 
thousands of people take the risk of being tortured, raped, or murdered based on a biased 
image. The third strategic approach aims to disrupt the reinforcing feedback of social 
influence and malicious influence activity by providing a more realistic narrative of the 
very real potential dangers of illegal migration through widespread media campaigns and 
education. 
As an advantage, the strategy offers a comprehensive and long-term approach to 
address the problem by providing a secure environment and mitigating the negative effects 
of social influence. On the other hand, as the strategy involves the implications in the 
information domain, the long-term systemic behavior could be utterly complex. The time 
horizon for implementation is 2–10 years. 
Effectiveness could be measured by a decrease of those who are willing to illegally 
migrate and the actual number of emigrants or displaced people. The assessment would 
also employ surveys and statistical analysis.  




Figure 29. Strategic Approach 3, Focus Areas 








Strategy Political and 
institutional 
capability building. 





Enhanced border protection. 
Bilateral cooperation with 
donor and transit countries. 
Enhanced law enforcement 
operations against 
smuggling groups  







Pros Enduring structural 
effect. 
Direct effect on security 
threats on a short run. 
Comprehensive and 
long-term approach. 
Cons Costly and time 
consuming. 
Severe failure of strategy 














Horizon 10–15 years 1–3 years 2–10 years 
Measure of 
Effectiveness Political and military stability. 
Decreased level of 
emigration. 
Decreased number of IBCs 











Statistical analysis and 
system dynamics modeling. 
Surveys, statistical 
analysis, and system 
modelling.  
 
c. Strategy Comparison and Selection 
This section evaluates the different strategic approaches in respect to a set of 
perspectives. The selected perspectives and their relative weight are determined by the 
planning team based on the planning objectives, available resources, priorities of the 
executive committee, and the evaluations of the SMEs. Based on the considered criteria 
(Table 10), the third strategic approach is the recommended option. 










Time Required 1 3 2 
Assessment Time 1 3 2 
Flexibility 2 1 3 
Simplicity 2 3 1 
Resources 1 2 2 
Comprehensive 
solution (x2) 2(4) 1(2) 3(6) 
Risk (x2) 2(4) 1(2) 2(4) 




8. Description of the Organization in the Future and Assessment 
Methodology 
The strategy development is followed by strategy selection and implementation.209 
As the final step of the planning process, NATO implements the selected strategy and 
develops the methodology to evaluate the results. The planning team coordinates the net 
assessment of the strategy to evaluate its effectiveness. The aim of net assessment is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented strategy weighted against the effectiveness 
of the smuggling network and illegal migration in the context of the objectives of the 
migration system. The assessment is conducted semi-annually in the first year, then 
annually until the end of the implementation. The assessment applies surveys, statistical 
analysis, and system modeling conducted by the SMEs and the EU Joint Research Center. 
The result of the assessment is reported to the Executive Committee, who might 
recommend strategy adjustment to the SACEUR. 
 




The statistical evidence indicates that illegal mass migration is positively related 
with diaspora count in the target country and unemployment rate of the country of origin. 
On the other hand, HDI, polity level, and distance are negatively related with IBCs. While 
GDP per capita, armed conflicts, and PTS are not statistically significant, we can interpret 
these variables as non-linear probabilistic factors based on further analysis. In other words, 
we can argue that a higher level of armed conflict or higher political terror level appears to 
increase the probability of migration, although the relationship is not linear nor statistically 
significant. A non-linear relationship is also evident in case of GDP per capita. Based on 
the statistical analysis, I conclude that there is a threshold level between $1,100 and $1,500 
per capita that produces the highest level of illegal migration in the Central Mediterranean 
region, while values below or above this level both decrease the probability of migration. 
Consequently, a strategy that applies capability building in low-income countries should 
expect an increased level of migration at first then a decrease over the long run. Also, I 
found enough statistical evidence to infer a strong positive relationship between the number 
of IBCs and the number of terrorist attacks in the EU. 
Socio-economic factors themselves cannot explain the behavior of the illegal 
migration system. I argue that a susceptible population makes decision based on distorted 
and biased perceptions—pseudo environment—that is significantly different from the real 
environment. There is a strong social influence at play that is responsible for shaping the 
perception of millions of people and generates large scale migration. The main elements of 
this abstract social network are the migrant population, the diaspora, and the smugglers, 
where the distorted information from family members and friends living in a diaspora and 
the narrative of smuggling organizations shape the perception of possible migrants. When 
the messaging of diaspora members and smuggling groups reaches a critical mass of 
people, social diffusion becomes a key factor. As Everton and Pfaff note, if the social 
diffusion of an idea or a practice reaches a certain level, it becomes a self-reinforcing 
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process and is very difficult to control beyond a certain point.210 Perhaps this phenomenon 
played a crucial role in the unprecedented peak of IBCs in 2015. Nevertheless, the mixed 
signals and the lack of unitary migratory policy of the EU also play important roles in the 
information environment. 
Twitter data analysis revealed a relationship between geographical location and 
sentiment toward mass migration. Conversations expressed negative sentiment in frontier 
countries, while countries facing second- or third-order effects of illegal migration tended 
to express positive sentiment toward the problem. However, the perception of the societies 
in target countries does not necessarily correlate with the political approach of the 
respective government. Democratic institutions generate time delay and non-linearity 
between the sentiment of a society and the political leadership. The significant time delay 
and non-linearity can be major factors that characterize the behavior of the illegal migration 
system. 
Further, the SNA of the smuggling organizations revealed a flexible and resilient 
social structure that might be responsible for the fluid characteristics of migration flow 
within the region. I argue that disrupting even a large and overarching smuggling group 
has little effect on the overall migratory flow as the whole network quickly fills the power 
vacuum and rapidly reorganizes itself. Instead, a systemic approach is required that affects 
multiple leverage points and aims to trigger a behavioral change of the overall system.  
The system analyses also revealed the interconnectedness of the parts of the illegal 
migration system and identified dominant time delays. The feedback network and the 
causal relations between the parts of the system are represented in Figure 25. These 
findings support the hypothesis that systems thinking is a valid approach to address illegal 
mass migration. A strategy that affects multiple leverage points and considers not just the 
socio-economic but also the social-psychological factors of illegal migration has a decent 
probability to succeed. 
 
210 Everton and Pfaff, “Historical and Comparative Research on Social Diffusion.“ 
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For future study, I would suggest system dynamics modeling of the illegal 
migration system, which might be a very useful tool for future policy analysis. Also, a 
deeper multidisciplinary analysis of the role of social influence in the decision to migrate 









APPENDIX A. CHAPTER I—STATISTICAL AND GEOSPATIAL 
ANALYSIS 
A. LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL—TERRORIST ATTACKS PER 
ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS 
This appendix shows statistical evidence of the link between terrorist activity levels 
within the EU and the number of IBCs to Europe. According to the EU Terrorism Situation 
& Trend Report (Te-Sat), we can highlight a significant increase in arrests for jihadist 
terrorism from 2015.211 While the suspects were mostly second or third generation 
migrants between 2014 and 2017, the number of foreign terrorist fighters shows a 
significant increase from 2016.212 In cases like the Würzburg attack on 18 July 2016, the 
Nurnberg attack on 24 July 2016, and the Hamburg attack on 28 July 2017, the 
investigation indicated that the suspects arrived in the EU by illegal migration flow.213 We 
can anticipate that there is a correlation—cause and effect relationship—between IBCs and 
terrorist attack levels within the EU. 
This statistical analysis applies linear regression to explore the relationship between 
the number of IBCs as an independent variable and completed terrorist attacks within EU 
member countries as a dependent variable.,214215 The observation period is 2009–2018. 
We have enough statistical evidence (t = 5.23, p-value < 0.001) to infer a strong 
positive relationship between illegal migration and terrorist attacks in the EU (confidence 
level 99%). The regression model gives the best fit if we apply a one-year lag for the IBCs 
data. In other words, it takes an average of one year to activate the terrorist cell after arrival 
to the EU. We can claim that 77% of the increased number of arrests can be explained by 
 
211 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat) 2018. 
212 Róbert Bartkó, A Terrorizmus Elleni Küzdelem Aktuális Kérdései a XXI. Században (Actualities of 
Counter-terrorism in the 21st Century) (Budapest, Hungary: Gondolat Kiadó, 2019), 177. 
213 Bartkó, A Terrorizmus Elleni Küzdelem Aktuális Kérdései a XXI. Században (Actualities of 
Counter-terrorism in the 21st Century). 
214 European Commission, ‘Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings; Monthly Statistics’. 
215 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat) 2018. 
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illegal migration (R2=0.77). Specifically, those countries that are considered primary 
targets of illegal migration suffer the most from jihadist terrorist attacks.216 
 




216 Adapted from Frontex, “Detection of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics”; and Europol, EU 
Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat) 2018. 
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APPENDIX B. CHAPTER IV—PERCEPTION OF ILLEGAL 
MIGRATION IN DESTINATION COUNTRIES 
A. CODEBOOK217 
Table 11. Twitter Database Codebook—Relationships 
Relationships 
Type Description 
Retweet “A Retweet is a re-posting of a Tweet.”218 Twitter’s Retweet 
feature helps users to share others’ tweets with their followers. 
This study considers a retweet to be a social tie between the user 
of the original tweet and the retweeter. The direction of the tie is 
pointing from the retweeter to the user of the original tweet.219  
Quote Quote is retweeting a part of the original tweet while adding your 
own ideas or thoughts to it.220 This study also considers quotes 
to be a social tie between the user of the original tweet and the 
user of the quote, where the direction of the tie is pointing from 
the quoter to the user of the original tweet. 
Reply A reply is a response to another person’s tweet.221 This study 
also considers replies to be a social tie between the user of the 
original tweet and the user of the reply, where the direction of 




217 Twitter, “Twitter API.“ 
218 Twitter, “Twitter Retweet FAQS – Deleting, RTs, and More,” Twitter, accessed 16 April 2021, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/retweet-faqs. 
219 Twitter. 
220  “How to Retweet,” Twitter, accessed 16 April 2021, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/
how-to-retweet. 




Table 12. Twitter Database Codebook—Attributes 
Attributes 
Type Description 
Source Twitter user who reacted to a tweet using any of the observed 
hashtags. 
Target Twitter user who tweeted the original message. 
Relationship Interaction between two users characterized by retweet, quote, or 
reply. 
User_id Unique identifier for a user, expressed by integers. 
Retweeted “Indicates whether this Tweet has been Retweeted by the 
authenticating user.”222 
Qquoted_status_id “This field contains the integer value Tweet ID of the quoted 
Tweet.”223 
In_reply_to_status_id “If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will contain the 
integer representation of the original Tweet’s ID.”224 
Reply_to_user_id “If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will contain the 
string representation of the original Tweet’s ID.”225 
Reply_to_screen_name “If the represented Tweet is a reply, this field will contain the 












B. GROUPS BY BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
Table 13. Top Ten Groups by Betweenness Centrality 
Number Size Betweenness  Location 
43 571 374.967 Italy 
28 155 289.599 France/Belgium/Germany 
39 470 223.02 Northern Italy 
38 352 158 Germany 
10 139 117.75 UK/AUS/CAN/US 
3 242 81.341 Switzerland 
31 128 75.888 Italy 
22 141 49.046 Belgium 
12 143 42.466 Switzerland 
17 28 41 Eastern Europe 
 
C. LIST OF GROUPS BY SENTIMENTS 
Table 14. Top Five Negative Sentiment Groups 
Number Size Betweenness  Location 
27 27 0 Spain 
39 470 223.02 Northern Italy 
5 12 0 N/A 
41 463 8.372 Italy 
31 128 75.888 Italy 
Table 15. Top Five Positive Sentiment Groups 
Number Size Betweenness  Location 
3 242 81.341 Switzerland 
4 43 0 Malta 
30 46 0 Germany 
6 13 0 Germany 
8 131 0.5 N/A 
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D. TWITTER NETWORK DEGREE REPORT 
The Degree Report shows the unique topographical characteristics of the Twitter 
communication network. We can see the clear indication of a scale free network—
characterized by power law—where a low number of actors controls most of the resources 
(information in this case).227 
 
Figure 31. Degree Report of Twitter Communication Network (QGIS) 
 
227 Barabási and Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks.“ 
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APPENDIX C. CHAPTER VI—SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF 
THE ERITREAN SMUGGLING NETWORK 
A. CODEBOOK 
Network boundaries: An actor qualifies as a member of the smuggling group if 
he or she has an active role in smuggling operations under the direct or indirect control of 
one of the key leaders. 
Table 16. Codebook for the Social Network Analysis of Eritrean 
Smuggling Group—Relationships 
Relationships 
Type Description Value (Weight) 
Cooperation Common involvement in migrant 
smuggling activity including 
financial operation, transportation, 
logistical support on coordination of 
illicit activity. 
Number of contacts during 
observation period: 
1 = 1–99 
2 = 100–499 
3 = 500–999 
4 = 1000–1999 
5 = 2000 and above 
Superior/ 
Subordinate 
Direct influence and control over an 
actor conducting migrant smuggling 
operations.  
N/A 
Trust The investigation identified trust 
between actors. 
N/A 
Financial Collection and transfer of money 
directly linked to smuggling activity. 
Sum of money transferred during 
observation period: 
1 = 1–4,999 EUR 
2 = 5,000-14,999 EUR 
3 = 15,000-29,999 EUR 
4 = 30,000-49,999 EUR 




Table 17. Codebook for the Social Network Analysis of Eritrean 
Smuggling Group—Attributes 
Attributes 
Type Description Value (Weight) 
Operating Main area of operation Country, province, or city 










Nationality Place of birth or ethnicity Characters 
Sex Gender of the actor Categorical: Male / Female 
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